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GOVERNMENT IDENTITY SPEECH AND RELIGION:
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS AFTER SUMMUM
Mary Jean Dolan*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers in-depth analysis of the opinions in Pleasant Grove v. Summum. 
Summum is a significant case because it expands “government speech” to cover broad,
thematic government identity messages in the form of donated monuments, includ-
ing the much-litigated Fraternal Order of Eagles-donated Ten Commandments.  The
Article explores the fine distinctions between the new “government speech doctrine”—
a defense in Free Speech Clause cases that allows government to express its own view-
point and to reject alternative views—and “government speech” analyzed under the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government from expressing a viewpoint on
religion, and from favoring some religions over others.  The Court’s decision, to char-
acterize all public monuments as expressing “government-controlled” messages which
reflect municipal identity, should impact the Establishment Clause calculus.  Using
social meaning theory, I show how the Culture Wars have transformed the message
of governmental religious displays, and how Summum has eliminated the donor’s
ambiguating role, which played a part in Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence.
The Article also serves a valuable function by contesting claims that Summum
has eliminated the Establishment Clause endorsement test, or that it dangerously
allows government to convert any and all private speech to its own, thus deflecting
Free Speech claims.  My interpretation shows that the decision is multi-faceted and
contextual; it relies on government’s expressive intent, an inherently communicative
medium, and viewers’ reasonable attributions regarding monument speech.  As shown
below, the Court’s exposition on the unfettered indeterminacy of monuments’ content
either has been misconstrued, or renders the opinion internally inconsistent.  I conclude
by proposing a compromise solution: it requires a new level of transparency for the
history-based rationales used to explain existing public religious displays, and closer
scrutiny of any new government religious displays that are initiated in this religiously-
divisive time.  Finally, my proposal is illustrated by application to Ten Commandments
monuments and the Salazar v. Buono narrative.
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INTRODUCTION
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the United States Supreme Court held
unanimously that a city’s acceptance and display of privately-donated, permanent
monuments in a public park is “government speech,” so that its selection decisions are
not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny.1  This rejection of the Tenth Circuit’s use
of public forum analysis was virtually inevitable2 because, as it turned out, a large
percentage of the country’s monuments were donated or initiated by the private sector,
so that a win for Summum risked massive upheaval.3  The Court’s reasoning, how-
ever, stands to have a strong impact on both the “recently minted” government speech
doctrine4 and—because the park display included a donated Ten Commandments
monument—the Establishment Clause challenges likely to follow.5
1 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009).
2 See Mary Jean Dolan, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: 9-0 Decision Makes Sense,
NAT’L L. J., Mar. 23, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202429210502&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (providing the simple explanation for the unanimous
decision); Mary Jean Dolan, Issues and Implications: The Summum Oral Argument, FIRST
AMENDMENT L. PROF BLOG, Nov. 14, 2008, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/firstamendment/
2008/11/summum-argument.html (predicting 9-0 outcome).
3 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28, Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter U.S. Brief] (listing
national monuments donated in whole or part); Brief for the American Legion et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6–7, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009)
(No. 07-665) [hereinafter American Legion Brief] (same for war memorials); Brief for the
City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1–2, Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter NYC Brief] (same for New York
City’s monuments); Brief for the International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 6, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No.
07-665) [hereinafter IMLA Brief] (providing the Court with a broad set of illustrations of
privately-donated monuments from a broad range of municipalities of various sizes from all
areas of the country); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: The Supreme
Court’s Puzzling, Fascinating New Free Speech Decision, FINDLAW, Mar. 5, 2009, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20090305.html [hereinafter Hamilton Blog] (“[T]he case
was carried to a large degree by the effective amicus briefs filed by [IMLA, NYC] and the
American Legion . . . .[T]he opinion is driven by the facts that they put on the table.”).
4 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Humanist Ass’n, In Wake of Summum, Humanists Will
Target Ten Commandments Monuments (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.american
humanist.org/news/details/2009-02-in-wake-of-summum-humanists-will-target-ten-
commandments -monuments (“In the wake of today’s U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 07-665, the American Humanist Association announced it has been
given just what it needs to pursue the removal of Ten Commandments monuments on public
property all over America.”); see also Robert Barnes, City Can Reject Religious Display,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2009, at A2 (Brian Barnard, Summum’s lawyer, said that an Establish-
ment Clause challenge to Pleasant Grove City’s Ten Commandments monument “would be
the church’s next legal fight”).
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Summum is significant because the opinion extended the Court’s government
speech doctrine to include not only specific, objective program policies (e.g., pro-
moting recycling), but also broad, thematic municipal identity messages.6  In earlier
articles, and in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the International Municipal Lawyers
Association (IMLA), I argued that extending the new doctrine to include municipal
“identity speech” can enhance the speech market and frequently is necessary to facili-
tate the increasing number of public-private expressive partnerships.7  As reflected in
my prior work and in the Summum opinion, “identity speech” can be loosely defined
as expression that is consistent with a government’s identified or desired image and
values, especially communitarian and promotional themes.8  In addition, the Court
took this step in a new context: Summum also is the Supreme Court’s first government
speech decision that does not involve a government-funded program.9
This Article analyzes Summum’s impact on the only clearly-acknowledged limit
on government speech—the Establishment Clause—and shows why the Court’s ex-
pansion of “government speech” as a Free Speech Clause defense should heighten
the Court’s scrutiny of government’s religious speech.
6 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133–34.
7 IMLA Brief, supra note 3 (cited in Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133, 1135 n.3, 1136);
Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7 (2008) [hereinafter Dolan 2008] (applying
theory to unique context of monuments; explaining IMLA empirical research and noting
Establishment Clause issue); Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and
Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 71 (2004) [hereinafter Dolan 2004] (developing theory and applying to special pro-
grams, banners, and city websites). Defining the limits to this expanded doctrine to preserve
free speech and other constitutional values is a critical project, one explored in an expanding
body of valuable scholarship. See Dolan 2004, supra, at 75 n.18 (collecting early scholarly
critiques); see infra note 115 (collecting additional articles proposing such limits).
8 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133–34 (donated monuments are government speech
in part because they are selected “for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park” and are displayed in a park “that is linked to the
City’s identity”); Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 29 & n.131 (municipalities accept only those
proposed monuments that are “consistent with that municipality’s broad identity messages,”
which often are reflected in its public promotional statements); IMLA Brief, supra note 3,
at 12–13 (IMLA’s “Municipal Practice Examples” showed how governments’ decisions re-
garding monuments “express community ideals at the time of installation”); Dolan 2004,
supra note 7, at 111–12 (arguing that Rust v. Sullivan should be extended to certain contexts
where “a government is communicating its own views on the city’s identity and purposes, what
will draw tourists and investments, and what image it should present to the larger world” and
“has joined forces with the private sector . . . to convey its own broad subjective message”);
see also infra Part IV (for additional illustrations of the “identity speech” concept).
9 For over a decade, however, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have been wrestling with
government speech claims in contexts that cannot be characterized as government funding
decisions, including public art programs, sponsor acknowledgments, and specialty license
plates. See, e.g., infra note 195 (comparing cases finding certain license plates as government
speech and others as private speech).
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The focal point of all public attention on this free speech case, and its impetus,
was Summum’s claim of religious discrimination.10  The City’s historically-themed
Pioneer Park included one of the much-litigated Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Ten
Commandments monuments, and the City had turned down Summum’s offer of its
tiny religion’s competing “Seven Aphorisms” monument.11  Four years earlier, in Van
Orden v. Perry, a 5-4 decision, the Court had dismissed an Establishment Clause
challenge to the display of a similar Eagles-donated Ten Commandments monument
on the Texas State Capitol grounds.12
And so, the litigation was permeated with the question Chief Justice Roberts
posed to the City’s counsel: “Mr. Sekulow, you’re really just picking your poison,
aren’t you?  I mean, the more you say that the monument is government speech to get
out of the . . . Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you’re walking into a trap
under the Establishment Clause.”13  Preliminary reactions among legal commentators,
and the several Justices who addressed the issue, were mixed; some maintained that
Van Orden is unaffected because it was based on the monument’s secular meaning,
and not on a finding that it was the Eagles’ speech.14
10 See, e.g., Editorial, A Case of Religious Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008,
at A30; Jesse Bravin, 10 Commandments vs. 7 Aphorisms: A New Religion Covets Legitimacy,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A14 (stating that “the subtext of the battle—a New Age reli-
gion seeking the same treatment as a more established faith”); Michael Kessler, The Court’s
Monumental Error, ON FAITH, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2009, 9:39 AM), http://onfaith
.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/georgetown/just_law_and_religion/ (“Pleasant Grove City, with
the Court’s blessing, endorsed one type of religious speech over another.”).
11 See infra Part I.
12 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
13 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125
(2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter Summum Transcript], available at http://www.supremecourt
.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-665.pdf (Jay Sekulow was Counsel for Pleasant
Grove City).
14 See, e.g., Michael Dorf, You May Say Justice Alito Is a Dreamer, But He’s Not the Only
One, DORF ON LAW (Mar. 2, 2009, 11:56 PM), http://michaeldorf.org/2009_03_01_archive
.html (on impact of Summum, concluding that only two Justices (Scalia and Thomas) “argue[d]
that if the Establishment Clause issue were squarely before the Court it would change nothing,”
while four Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens) argued that “it would potentially
change the analysis”); Calvin Massey, Thoughts on Pleasant City v. Summum, THE FACULTY
LOUNGE, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2009/02/thoughts-on-pleasant-city
-v-summum-.html (“[T]he effect of the decision is to increase the significance of the endorse-
ment test for determining when governmental display of religious imagery or text violates the
Establishment Clause.”); Press Release, Am. Humanist Ass’n, supra note 5 (proclaiming that
Summum has given it “just what it needs to pursue the removal of Ten Commandments
monuments on public property all over America”). Compare Ian Bartrum, Essay, Pleasant
Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 43, 47
(2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2009/05/16/bartrum.pdf (concluding that
Van Orden is insufficient to deflect a claim that Pleasant Grove’s Ten Commandments violates
the Establishment Clause), with Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 73 n.15 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
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This Article asserts that Summum should significantly impact the Establishment
Clause calculus.  The point of the new “government speech doctrine,” which is used
as a defense in Free Speech Clause cases, is to allow government to express its own
viewpoint and to reject alternative views.15  The essence of the Establishment Clause,
in contrast, is to prohibit government from expressing a viewpoint on religion, and
from favoring some religions over others.16  And now, the Summum opinion has char-
acterized all public monuments as expressing “government-controlled” messages,
selected to reflect that government’s identity.17  While many of its parameters are con-
tested,18 the Establishment Clause does not permit governments to affirmatively com-
municate that a particular, stand-alone religious creed serves in that newly-articulated
role.19  Van Orden should be reassessed in light of Summum’s strong statements
describing why monuments are government speech,20 and all public monuments with
religious themes should be reviewed through Summum’s new lens.  Also, Justice
Breyer’s controlling concurrence in Van Orden relied in part on the donor’s mediating
role21—extinguished by Summum.22  That Summum involved rejection of a minority
religion’s monument highlights the dilemma, but is not the only problem.
The stakes are high.  As Professor Noah Feldman recently described it, we are a
nation “divided by God.”23  As many have decried, the ongoing, heated battles over
church-state issues between what he terms “legal secularists” and “values evangelicals”
have dominated America’s politics and distracted us from productive compromise on
pressing problems.24  Governmental displays of the Ten Commandments have been
a recurring rallying point; in Professor Steven Goldberg’s memorable phrase, some
conservative activists have turned this Old Testament icon into “the Nike Swoosh
of religion.”25
2009/30/LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf (concluding that an Establishment Clause challenge to
Pleasant Grove City’s Ten Commandments display would not succeed due to Van Orden).
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Part V.
20 While Summum will have a larger impact, this Article focuses primarily on how Summum
affects Establishment Clause analysis of passive government identity speech, particularly govern-
mental display of religious monuments.
21 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
22 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134–36 (2009).
23 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 235 (2005).
24 Id. at 235–36 (seeking a workable compromise between the two groups, Feldman argues
that the best approach is to allow governmental religious symbolism, but to prohibit any gov-
ernment funding of religious organizations); see also, e.g., JIM WALLIS, GOD’S POLITICS: WHY
THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE LEFT DOESN’T GET IT 3–7 (2005) (discussing the political
impasse from a Christian theological perspective).
25 STEVEN GOLDBERG, BLEACHED FAITH: THE TRAGIC COST WHEN RELIGION IS FORCED
INTO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 1 (2008) (stating when “an overwhelmingly Christian government”
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In addition, there has been much speculation among legal academics about the
full impact of the Roberts Court on religion clause jurisprudence; Summum could
pave the way for seismic change. Some separationists predict a new era of “non-
preferentialism,” a term which means that government is allowed to prefer religion
over non-religion, so long as it is neutral among different religions and sects.26 
Commentators have argued that Pleasant Grove City’s choices violate that doctrine,
and even exemplify Justice Scalia’s sectarian view that the Establishment Clause
allows government to embrace Biblical monotheism.27  Simultaneously, the Court
has re-imagined the neutrality principle to require equal access for religious speakers
in government facilities and government-funded programs.28  Equal access cases,
posts on the county courthouse the statement, “I the LORD thy God am a Jealous God, visiting
the iniquity of the fathers upon the child unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate
me,” they are not really advocating that particular passage, but rather “are posting a symbol,”
one that has come to be associated with “the war to push religion into the public square”).
26 E.g., Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
1, 4, 24 (2006) [hereinafter Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause] (predicting that Justice
Alito and Chief Justice Roberts will complete the transformation of the Establishment Clause
from a separationist model to an “integrationist” regime, and will follow Justice Scalia’s
view that the United States is a monotheistic nation, entitled to display its religious symbols);
Kelly S. Terry, Shifting Out of Neutral: Intelligent Design and the Road to Nonpreferentialism,
18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 67 (2008) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are likely
to join Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy to create the 5-4 majority needed to overturn de-
cades of Establishment Clause precedent and institute a new standard of “nonpreferentialism”).
The departures from the Court of Justice O’Connor, the endorsement test’s creator and lead-
ing proponent, and Justice Souter, a strong dissenter in Van Orden, and Justice Sotomayor’s
fresh slate, all create substantial uncertainty in this area. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, 2
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 182–83 (2008) (questioning survival of endorsement test
post-Justice O’Connor).
27 Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: The Supreme Court Finds a Public
Display of the Ten Commandments to be Permissible Government Speech, 2009 CATO S. CT.
REV. 271, 291–92 (2008); see also Leslie Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The
Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 1, 43 (2010); see infra notes 188–90
and accompanying text (discussing nonpreferentialism in Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary
County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
28 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). In many contexts, such as the use of public meet-
ing rooms to show an evangelical Christian film on parenting approved in Lamb’s Chapel, this
new development has been relatively non-controversial; I agree with the outcome in both
these cases.
My own perspective, though, is that as government partners more freely with religious
organizations to achieve social welfare goals, it is all the more essential that it maintains
neutrality between religious and secular perspectives in its symbolic identity speech (as well
as in its distribution of aid and provision of services). See Mary Jean Dolan, A New Risk on
an Uncertain Path: Establishment Clause Guidelines for Municipal Aid to Religious
Organizations, 49 MUN. LAW. 15 (2008); Mary Jean Dolan, Government-Sponsored
Chaplaincies and Crisis: Walking the Fine Line in Disaster Response and Daily Life, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 507 (2008). For a full development of this approach see Ira C.
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such as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,29 have trans-
formed forum analysis by re-labeling content limits on all religion as discrimination
against individuals’ religious speech.30  Summum risks recasting government speech
promoting religion: changing it from an Establishment Clause problem, and into a
Free Speech Clause defense against private speakers who assert a different viewpoint
on religion.
The proposal set forth in this Article is a realistic approach to an intractable conflict. 
First, as to any previously-existing, permanent public displays with religious content,
it is insufficient to have a religion-neutral rationale and use it as a defense in litigation:
government’s minimum duty is to declare and explain its religion-neutral rationale to
all viewers.31  Contrary to a recent comment by Chief Justice Roberts, appropriate dis-
claimers with context-creating explanations are not “warning signs” that insult reli-
gion,32 but rather are an essential affirmation of Establishment Clause values.  Second,
now that monuments are defined as “government speech” expressing a government’s
viewpoint, new government monuments with arguably religious themes should be pro-
hibited, unless the government can show that any religious content is negligible com-
pared to a clear secular meaning.33  This proposal addresses what remains a resilient
issue: recently, a petition for certiorari was denied in yet another Ten Commandments
case, Green v. Haskell County—and this time the case involved a recently-erected
monument, which caused controversy from the start and led quickly to litigation.34
The Court’s recently-decided case involving religious symbols and government
property, Salazar v. Buono,35 did not resolve, or even address, the “government speech”
conundrum raised by Summum.  Buono involved a large cross war memorial, erected
Lupu, Government Messages & Government Money: Sante Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the
Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 816–17 (2001) (arguing in
support of the Court’s then-current direction, for retaining “some form of separationist
principle designed to keep government from taking positions on matters of religious faith,
celebration, and observance,” while allowing government aid to religious organizations under
“a regime of equal access, nondiscrimination and formal neutrality”).
29 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (denying funding to Christian evangelical student publication where
other student publications funded violated Free Speech Clause).
30 See infra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
31 See infra Part V.
32 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2010) (No.
08-472), available at http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Salazar_v._Buono [herein-
after Buono Transcript] (This comment was Chief Justice Roberts’s reaction to the new admin-
istration’s proposal, mentioned at the Buono oral argument by General Kagan, that, should the
land transfer be approved, then the National Park Service intends to post a sign along the road
to explain that the cross stands on privately-owned land.).
33 See infra Part V (explaining the very limited categories of religiously-themed monuments,
such as statues of missionary explorers, which would satisfy this test).
34 See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Commr’s, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010) (discussed infra notes 181, 318 and accompanying text).
35 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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in 1934 by WWI veterans, and displayed on federal land in the Mojave National
Preserve.36  Starting from a complex procedural history, the Court’s decision remanded
the case, strongly suggesting that transferring the underlying land to the Veterans of
Foreign Wars (VFW) was sufficient to remedy the previously-adjudicated Establish-
ment Clause violation.37  This Article focuses on Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
rather than a comparison of the two cases, but Part V does use Buono’s basic narrative
as one of two illustrative applications of my proposed solution.
As Justice Souter observed: “The interaction between the ‘government speech
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not . . . begun to be worked out
[and Summum] shows that it may not be easy to work out.”38  Thus, substantial back-
ground on these two principles is essential to exegesis of the Summum opinions. 
Part I introduces the case as it reached the Court, including the Tenth Circuit’s earlier
precedent holding a Ten Commandments monument private speech, and an explanation
of the limited public forum option not taken.  Part II explains the Court’s nascent
“government speech” doctrine, the several lines of cases sometimes referred to by that
name, and the critical meaning of the Summum Court’s choice: to rely on its “core”
government-viewpoint-based doctrine, rather than its precedent for discretionary
selection of private speech.  Part III begins to work out how the use of “government
speech” in Establishment Clause case law differs from the new Free Speech Clause
“government speech doctrine.”
Part IV provides my in-depth analysis of Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court,
including his affirmative case for government speech, his secondary argument against
using forum analysis, and his inconsistent musings on the meanings of monuments. 
Then, it evaluates all opinions addressing Summum’s Establishment Clause implica-
tions, whether explicitly or implicitly.  Part IV shows that Summum repeatedly relied
on government’s intent to communicate meaning through donated monuments, and
on viewers’ attribution of monuments’ messages to the government.
Part V then applies scholarship on law and social meaning to show why judicial
labeling of an expressly religious creed as core “government speech”—particularly
in the current cultural context—is unconstitutional.  After analyzing two recent sug-
gestions for doctrinal change, Part V details my proposal for using disclaimers and
a robust endorsement test, and shows why this is the most feasible current option, as
well as a balanced solution which respects both traditional culture and an increasingly
diverse citizenry.
I. CASE BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS OF FORUM OPTIONS
Pleasant Grove City’s Pioneer Park contains some fifteen historical buildings and
permanent artifacts, many showcasing the City’s history, and most donated by private
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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persons or groups.39  The Park’s displays include a Ten Commandments monument,
which was donated by the local Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971, and displayed in
the Park pursuant to the City Council’s vote.40  As is now common lore, this display
was part of the Eagles’ nationwide campaign to distribute the familiar code in an effort
to combat juvenile delinquency.41  These monuments have been the subject of decades
of litigation,42 culminating—though apparently not ending—with Van Orden.43
Summum is a religious organization, founded in 1975 and headquartered in Salt
Lake City, approximately thirty-five miles from Pleasant Grove.44  In 2003, Summum’s
President wrote the Mayor, requesting permission to erect in the Park a stone monu-
ment of Summum’s Seven Aphorisms, similar in size and appearance to the Ten
Commandment monument.45  Approaching Pleasant Grove followed several earlier
lawsuits, where Summum’s wins had been less than satisfying because the other local
governments had removed their Ten Commandments displays, rather than erect the
Seven Aphorisms.46  Summum’s request here, and in its earlier lawsuits, related to
39 The permanent displays include a wishing well donated by Lions Club, a millstone from
the City’s first flour mill donated by a local resident, park benches donated by Pleasant Grove
Garden Club, a stone from the original Mormon Temple in Nauvoo, Illinois donated by a City
resident, a historic winter sheepfold donated by a private company, an old granary donated by
City residents, the City’s first fire station donated by local resident, two displays of a tree and
a plaque that were donated by Pleasant Grove City Council and 4-H, and a September 11
monument constructed by a local Eagle Scout troop. U.S. Brief, supra note 3, at 2–3.
40 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
41 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 713–14 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (more than
one-hundred largely identical monoliths were distributed by the Eagles to state and local gov-
ernments during the 1960s and 1970s; initiated by a juvenile court judge to serve his stated goal
of reducing juvenile delinquency, the national distribution was assisted by Cecil B. DeMille
at the time of his movie, The Ten Commandments). See also Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d
292, 294–95 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing additional details of this fascinating story, including
Eagles’ original rejection of the idea based on fears that it might seem coercive or sectarian;
subsequently, representatives of the Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic faiths developed what
they viewed as a nonsectarian version of the Ten Commandments). For commentary on the
impossibility of a “nonsectarian” Ten Commandments, see infra note 187.
42 See Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten
Commandments: Compounding the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 33, 34 (2005) (compiling long list of cases challenging Ten Commandments displays
during the years 1997–2005).
43 In fact, an attorney for Summum has promised a renewed legal attack on the monoliths
based on Summum. Barnes, supra note 5.
44 See About Summum, http://www.summum.us/about/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
45 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30.
46 Previously, the Tenth Circuit twice had upheld Summum’s free speech claims using
limited public forum analysis, but in each case, the final result was removal of the Ten
Commandments monuments—and not the display of Summum’s alternative creed. See
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding permanent monu-
ments on lawn of city’s municipal building a nonpublic forum, Ten Commandment monu-
ment private speech and city’s rejection of Summum’s monument unconstitutional viewpoint
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its religion’s doctrine that the Seven Aphorisms are similar in origin to, and spiritu-
ally more advanced than, the Ten Commandments.47  The City denied the request
by letter, stating that all permanent displays in Pioneer Park either “directly relate
to the history of Pleasant Grove” or “were donated by groups with long-standing ties
to the . . . community.”48
It is worth noting here that nothing in the Record suggested that any members of
Summum had any ties at all to Pleasant Grove City, or that the Summum religion had
any connection to the City or its history.  Summum had argued, though, that the Ten
Commandments monument also was outside the scope of the stated content limitations:
the local Eagles chapter had been in existence for only two years prior to the donation.49 
discrimination); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 921–22 (10th Cir. 1997) (Summum
stated claim under Free Speech Clause; remanded to determine whether Salt Lake County acted
reasonably in declining Seven Aphorisms monument); see also Barnes, supra note 5 (according
to Brian Barnard, Summum’s lawyer, Summum’s other challenges to Ten Commandments
monuments led the government to remove the Ten Commandments, rather than to add the
Seven Aphorisms).
The historical reason these lawsuits proceeded under the Free Speech Clause was an early
Tenth Circuit precedent. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (1973) (Eagles’
Ten Commandment monument on courthouse lawn did not violate Establishment Clause
because such monuments convey a “primarily secular” message); see also Summum v.
Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanded in light of Pleasant Grove in 319
Fed. App’x 753 (10th Cir. 2009)) (rejection of Summum’s monument while displaying Ten
Commandments in public park violated strict scrutiny test for traditional public forum; question
of material fact whether attempted sale of underlying parcel to private party altered analysis);
Soc’y of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239, 1241 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005)
(stating “Anderson is now superseded by Van Orden,” and remanding case).
47 See Summum Philosophy, The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2010); see,
e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Bravin, supra note 10
(“A couple of decades after a visit from ‘beings Extraterrestrial’ inspired him to found the
Church of Summum in 1975, Summum Bonum Amen Ra, born Claude Nowell and known as
Corky, had another epochal encounter. He saw a monolith depicting the Ten Commandments
on the courthouse grounds in Salt Lake City, says Su Menu, the Summum religion’s current
leader, and ‘felt it would be nice to have the Seven Aphorisms next to them.’ The monument
would be inscribed with the principles that, according to Summum doctrine, Moses initially
intended to deliver to the Hebrews before deciding they weren’t ready to understand them.”).
The Seven Aphorisms of Summum are: 1) psychokinesis, 2) correspondence, 3) vibration,
4) opposition, 5) rhythm, 6) cause and effect, and 7) gender. Seven Summum Principles,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
48 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130.
49 See Brief of Respondent at 23, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125
(2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter Summum Respondent Brief] (“When the Eagles donated
their display in 1971, they were not an ‘established Pleasant Grove civic organization with
strong ties to the community,’ . . . their local chapter was just two years old.”); see also Brief
of Plaintiff/Appellant at 3, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. June
28, 2006) (No. 06-4057) (charging that claimed monument criteria not only were post facto,
but were viewpoint discriminatory as applied).
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While this assertion was never conclusively resolved, there is reason to believe that
the Eagles’ donation was at least a closer fit to Pleasant Grove’s criteria.  It is likely
that, when originated, the local Eagles chapter’s members, at least, loosely complied
with that criteria, in that its membership would have included primarily Pleasant
Grove City residents, many with roots in the community.
The next year, the City Council passed a resolution which codified its stated
past practice, and added procedures and additional criteria, including “safety and
esthetics.”50  In 2005, Summum sued, claiming that the City’s exclusion of its monu-
ment, while displaying other permanent monuments, violated the federal Free Speech
Clause.51  After the district court declined to require installation of its monument,
Summum appealed.52
The Tenth Circuit decided for Summum, and required the City to erect the Seven
Aphorisms monument.53  The court reasoned that because a public park is a traditional
public forum, the strict scrutiny test applied to the City’s content-based rejection of
Summum’s request.  Under longstanding First Amendment doctrine, in public streets
and parks, citizens’ free speech rights are robust, and government generally is allowed
only to regulate time, place and manner.  Any governmental restriction based on con-
tent must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and restrictions
based on viewpoint are prohibited.54  The Tenth Circuit held against the City on the
grounds that showcasing local history and culture is not a compelling reason, nor is
that criteria related to stronger state interests, including safety.55
Subsequently, there were two opinions dissenting from the Tenth Circuit’s denial
of the petition for a rehearing en banc.56  Judge Lucero asserted that limited public
forum analysis should apply.57  Under the established categorical approach, government
may create a forum by opening up its property to private speech, and then may limit its
use to certain categories of speakers or certain types of subject matter.58  In a limited
public forum, Free Speech Clause doctrine requires that any such content or speaker
limitations be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.59  As Judge Lucero correctly noted,
50 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130.
51 Id.
52 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
53 Id. at 1057.
54 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), dis-
cussed in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1126–28
(3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY TREATISE].
55 Summum, 483 F.3d at 1050–52, 1054.
56 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007).
57 Id. (Lucero, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 1174.
59 Id. at 1175. Note that the test is identical whether referred to as a “nonpublic forum,”
a “limited public forum,” or a “designated public forum” with content or speaker limitations.
See, e.g., Dolan 2004, supra note 7, at 77–78 (analyzing terminology issue); see also infra
Part IV.B for discussion of variations in forum terminology and the Court’s usage in Summum.
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in determining which kind of forum is involved, courts look to the type of access
sought.60  Here, he reasoned, Summum claimed the right to install a permanent monu-
ment in the public park; in essence, its claim was that the City had created a permanent
monument forum by accepting some donated monuments.  Finding the City’s stated cri-
teria to be reasonable content limitations, Judge Lucero argued for a remand to evaluate
whether its application of those criteria had been viewpoint-neutral.61
Judge McConnell asserted that once a city accepts and displays a donated monu-
ment on public land, that monument is government speech.62  His argument relied
heavily on city ownership and control of the physical structures, and applied the Circuit
Courts’ prevalent four-factor test for government speech.63  That test evaluates: (1) the
“central purpose” of the challenged speech; (2) the government’s degree of “editorial
control”; (3) the identity of the “literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government had
“ultimate responsibility for the contents” of the speech.64
In one of Summum’s earlier Free Speech Clause lawsuits, the Tenth Circuit had
used that test, and expressly held that the donated Ten Commandments monument dis-
played on Ogden’s city hall lawn was not government speech, but instead remained the
Eagles’ private speech.65  In Summum, the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the
four-factor test (which was discussed in all the briefs), and so it may be obsolete.  But
two points from Ogden bear mentioning here because they are relevant to the Summum
Court’s opinion and to this Article’s Establishment Clause analysis.  The Tenth Circuit
found the fourth element, “ultimate responsibility,” satisfied because the City had
acquired title to the monument.66  The Ten Commandments monument in Ogden failed
the first element, the Tenth Circuit held, because the monument’s “central purpose”
was to advance the donor’s view that the Ten Commandments provide a “moral code
for youth.”67
In a final interesting point from the case below, Judge McConnell did not directly
address the limited public forum option.  Instead, he rejected the majority’s use of the
strict scrutiny test, pointing out that if governments were prohibited from considering
60 Summum, 499 F.3d at 1072–73 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 1174.
62 Id. at 1176 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 1176–77.
64 Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 997 (2001) (finding that a sign acknowledging city sponsors on city’s
holiday display was government speech, triggering no obligation to include others); see also
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000) (public radio station allowed to reject KKK as sponsor);
Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
56 (2008) (applying similar factors to specialty license plates).
65 Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
66 Id. at 1005.
67 Id. at 1004. For complete analysis of the four-factor test’s application to Pleasant Grove
City’s donated monuments, see Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 32–37.
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content in accepting monuments, they would be forced to accept an “influx of
clutter” or remove cherished monuments.68  His implicit acknowledgment that the
limited public forum doctrine does nothing to provide government choice in monu-
ments presaged Justice Alito’s reductive approach to forum analysis in the Summum
majority opinion.69
II. PRE-EXISTING GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE: THE SUMMUM COURT’S
CHOICES
Justice Stevens noted in his Summum concurrence that the government speech
doctrine is “recently minted,” its canon narrowly comprised of three cases: Rust v.
Sullivan, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, and Garcetti v. Ceballos.70  As
recently as 2005, Justice Souter similarly described the doctrine as “relatively new,”
observing at that point: “the few cases in which we have addressed the doctrine have
for the most part not gone much beyond such broad observations” as, “it seems inevita-
ble that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression
to advocate and defend its own policies.”71  Given the ubiquity of governments working
with the private sector and spending money on speech-related activities, it is worth-
while to pause here, and to clarify how the Court has used the term “government
speech,” and has defined the “doctrine,” in the period leading up to Summum.
A. Core Government Speech & Government Messages
As shown below, Justices Stevens and Souter refer to a specific new category, what
I will refer to in this Article as “core” government speech, or the “government speech
doctrine.”  Similar concepts have figured into the specific doctrinal areas of school
speech and religious speech,72 and a related approach will be discussed in Part III.B
below.  Summum is a novel expansion of the government speech doctrine: not only
68 Summum, 499 F.3d at 1175–76 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
69 See infra Part IV.B (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137–38
(2009)). Judge McConnell’s approach related back, as well. The eradication of the amorphous
distinction between content and viewpoint arguably began in the religious speech equal access
cases, of which then-Professor McConnell was a chief architect. See FELDMAN, supra note
23, at 207–10 (laying out the litigation strategy and memorably describing McConnell as the
“Thurgood Marshall of values evangelicalism”).
70 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991), Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005), Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006)).
71 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72 For a discussion of school speech, see infra note 120 and accompanying text (including
showing new categorical blending, as school cases begin to cite Rust and Johanns, along with
the Court’s well-developed school speech precedent). Part III will explore what the concept
of government speech has meant in Establishment Clause claims.
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does the opinion uphold broad, thematic government identity expression, but it does
so outside the scope of a specific, clearly-defined institutional role or a government-
funded program.
The impact of a finding of “government speech” is dramatic: it eliminates the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality.  The starting point for this analytical category is
the truism that governments must express points of view on many topics as a neces-
sary part of governing: it is what they are elected to do.73  Citizens protesting that their
own speech has been excluded, restricted, or compelled by the government’s speech—
typically through a tax-funded program or policy—are said to have their remedy in the
political process.74  Moreover, as the Court reaffirmed in its starting point for analysis
in Summum: “A government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its
views when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering
a government-controlled message.”75
The initial case listed by Justice Stevens, Rust v. Sullivan, did not coin the term. 
Rather, in later cases, the Court characterized Rust as holding that “where the gov-
ernment is itself the speaker,” it is permitted to make “viewpoint-based funding
decisions.”76  Rust upheld a restriction on abortion counseling in federally-funded
health clinics, which served that Administration’s established pro-life policy, and thus
rejected the affected physicians’ free speech claim.77  The decision raised many trou-
bling concerns, including the narrowed scope of medical information available to
the poor women limited to these clinics, the money paid to induce providers to modify
their speech,78 and the governmental interference with physicians’ professional duty
to prioritize their patients’ needs.79
Prior to Summum, only one Supreme Court majority opinion, Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association, had explicitly rested on the “government speech doctrine”
to justify its holding for the government.80  In Johanns, the Court dismissed a
73 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (2009) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 229 (2000)).
74 Id.
75 Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562).
76 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2000) (discussing Rust);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (discussing Rust
and government’s ability to “use[] private speakers to transmit specific information”).
77 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–201 (1991).
78 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 576 (1996) (concluding that such “‘negative’ subsidies . . .
[are] presumptively unconstitutional”).
79 Indeed, subsequently the Court came to what seemed the precisely diametrical position
when it was lawyers’ professional duties to their clients that were impinged by federal law,
in Velasquez, 531 U.S. at 542. See, e.g., Robert Post, Essay, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE
L.J. 151, 167–77 (2006) (finding the distinctions drawn by the Court unsupportable to justify
the differing outcomes).
80 Note that the other cases cited in the Summum opinion to explain “government speech”
are either dicta or not majority opinions. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131, 1137.
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compelled-speech claim brought by a small group of specialty beef producers who
objected to paying a federal tax on their cattle because the fund was used to encour-
age beef consumption generically, which they believed contravened their business
interests.81  The ad campaign at issue had been created by an entity which included a
large contingent of private industry representatives, and bore the tag line, “[f]unded
by America’s Beef Producers.”82  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the ads
were “government speech,” primarily for two reasons: (i) the federal government had
a policy to promote beef consumption, which was documented in a federal statute; and
(ii) the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture “exercise[d] final approval authority
over every word used in every promotional campaign.”83
Both Rust and Johanns, then, involved a specific government policy (anti-abortion,
pro-beef).  The Court has characterized both cases as situations involving government-
funded programs in which private speakers were enlisted to express the program’s
government policy message.  Both cases were heavily criticized, particularly because
the government’s directorial role—hidden behind the seemingly private expression (by
individual physicians, and in the television ads)—was invisible to the public, except
to those few who happened to be familiar with the relevant federal statutes; thus,
neither was consistent with the government speech doctrine’s “political account-
ability” rationale.84  Before turning to the third case, Garcetti, which detours from the
Rust/ Johanns model, this Part next will compare the function and contours of what
are referred to here as the “speech selection” cases.
B. Discretionary Selection & Private Speech
The speech selection cases are grounded in “judgmental necessity,”85 and not
upon the elected government’s desire to express its views with the assistance of pri-
vate persons.  The Court has determined that when a government is engaged in cer-
tain types of roles, which thus far has included arts patron (Finley),86 public television
broadcaster (Forbes),87 and library (American Library Association),88 it necessarily
must consider content in selecting among private speech, and so its discretionary
81 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564–68 (2005).
82 Id. at 577 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 560–61 (majority opinion).
84 See, e.g., Post, supra note 79, at 168 n.103 (1996) (collecting articles criticizing Rust);
Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 317, 321 n.26 (2007) (collecting articles criticizing Johanns).
85 See Redish & Kessler, supra note 78, at 572 (coining the term “judgmental necessity”
in their analysis of what I call here the “speech selection” cases to convey situations where one
“cannot entirely preclude the influence of normative value judgments in the actual selection
of competing applicants”).
86 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
87 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
88 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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selection does not violate the Free Speech Clause.89  This leeway to exercise discretion
without clear guidelines is in sharp contrast, of course, to the usual constitutional
prohibition on unfettered selection of private speakers by government actors.90  This
approach also differs from the limited public forum doctrine, where content limitations
deemed overly vague are struck down on the grounds that they could provide govern-
ment decision-makers with a screen to hide unlawful viewpoint discrimination.91
In Finley, the Court upheld a statute which allowed the National Endowment for
the Arts (NEA) to consider “decency” and respect for Americans’ “diverse beliefs and
values” when making arts funding decisions.92  The essential rationale was the Court’s
recognition that, unavoidably, making aesthetic judgments on artistic excellence “is
inherently content-based.”93  Similarly, Forbes is relied on for the Court’s recognition
that “when a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and pre-
sentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity.”94  Exercising that dis-
cretion necessarily involves considering content, and rejecting some private speech in
favor of others, and so should not trigger judicial oversight or sanction.95  And lastly,
American Library Association stated that the “principles underlying Forbes and Finley
also apply to a public library’s exercise of judgment in selecting the material it pro-
vides to its patrons,” so that forum analysis is inapplicable in that context too.96
89 See Redish & Kessler, supra note 78, at 572 (generally approving of considering con-
tent where selection otherwise irrational, such as in awarding arts grants and similar types of
“positive auxiliary subsidies,” but critiquing Finley based on the specific limits pre-established
by Congress); see also Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 91–92 (1998) (calling for such “institutional specificity” as the best
method for resolving these complex First Amendment puzzles).
90 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988)
(striking down open-ended municipal regulation of news boxes on city sidewalks, the Court
noted that, regarding the “specter of content and viewpoint censorship,” the “danger is at its
zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled
discretion of a government official”).
91 See, e.g., Nat’l Abortion Rts. Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F.Supp.
2d 1320, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (striking down transit ad policy excluding matters of public
controversy, in part based on finding that terms such as “widely reported” and “reasonably
appears” gave government officials too much discretion).
92 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998).
93 Id. at 586; see, e.g., Redish & Kessler, supra note 78, at 581 (arguing that Finley was
decided wrongly because decency bears no relationship to artistic merit).
94 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (the case itself
involved a televised candidate debate that was analyzed as a limited public forum; the Court
described the debate as a narrow exception to public broadcasters’ general discretion to make
content-based programming selections among private speakers).
95 Id.
96 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (plurality) (upholding the Child
Internet Protection Act, which requires libraries receiving certain federal financial assistance
to install Internet pornography filters, the Court stated, “[p]ublic library staffs necessarily con-
sider content in making collection decisions”). Note that none of the Justices disagreed with
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These two lines of cases frequently have been referred to generically as “govern-
ment speech”;97 some variation in terminology is understandable given their similar
outcomes—freedom from the usual Free Speech Clause constraints—and relative
novelty.  There is, however, a clear line of demarcation between them.  The Rust/
Johanns model approves the expression of a governmental policy—a viewpoint—
through private speakers.  In contrast, the Finley/Forbes paradigm involves the govern-
mental “speech activity” of choosing among private speakers and their messages; this
content-based selection is permitted based on the realities of a government’s particular
functional role.  The “government speech doctrine” explicitly allows a government
administration to express its particular viewpoint on a subject without the correspond-
ing obligation to express contradictory views (postponing, for now, the important sub-
ject of independent constitutional limitations).  In the “speech selection” cases, how-
ever, there is uncertainty regarding government’s ability to consider “viewpoint” in
making “content” based selections.  While it is now unclear whether there is truly
a viable distinction between content and viewpoint, such categorizing may continue
in some specific contexts, as well as depend upon the degree, clarity, and impact of
government’s alleged consideration of viewpoint.
For example, while not definitive, in the Court’s most extensive analysis of this
issue, the Finley opinion seemed to conclude that discretionary arts funding selection
is constitutional unless it risks actual “suppression of disfavored viewpoints,” such that
certain views are driven from the marketplace.98  On the other hand, there certainly
the point that libraries have discretion in content selections for their collections. Id. at 214
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting).
97 For sources referring to both Rust and Finley as “government speech,” see, e.g., Gentala
v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacated and remanded in light of Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)) (relied on Finley, Forbes, and Rust as govern-
ment speech cases); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001) (analyzing Rust, Forbes, and Finley as three of eight dif-
ferent categories of government speech); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling
Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002) (referring to both
categories as government speech). Using the term “government speech” in this broader sense,
while noting the differences in the two lines of cases, flows from the novelty of a specially-
named “government speech” doctrine. See CHEMERINSKY TREATISE, supra note 54, at 979,
982–84 (placing Johanns in the compelled speech category, and Rust in the unconstitutional
conditions category, without combining them into a “government speech” category); KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 337, SUPP. at 12 (2d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2007) (same).
My earlier articles thus referred to the two lines of cases as two different types of government
speech with different doctrinal justifications. More recently, the trend has been to use the term
“government speech” exclusively to refer to the Rust/Johanns line of cases. See, e.g., Andy G.
Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365 (2009).
98 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1998) (holding that
the arts funding statute was constitutional unless and until it “is applied in a manner that
raises concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints” and that if funding imposed a
“disproportionate burden calculated to drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoint from the marketplace’”
that would be a “more pressing” question).
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would be First Amendment implications if a library were to exclude all books
sympathetic to socialism, or critical of Christianity, or if a public television station
refused to put on the air any speakers who questioned the Iraq War.99  In contrast,
under Summum, a city which displays an Iraq War memorial is now, quite explicitly,
permitted to reject proposals for monuments depicting Saddam Hussein, or that war’s
civilian casualties.100  While both lines of cases were argued to the Court in support of
Pleasant Grove City, only the Johanns doctrine clearly establishes the constitutionality
of government expressing its views on debatable issues through its selection and dis-
play of privately-donated monuments.  That choice, however, more clearly leaves the
government exposed to Establishment Clause challenges when the views expressed
are religious.
C. Managerial Prerogative & Government Institutions
Returning briefly to Garcetti v. Ceballos,101 the recent public employment
decision that has been described as the Court’s third “government speech” case, pro-
vides a useful case study.  It shows how the choice between the two lines of cases can
be outcome-determinative, and the perspective on which paradigm was used can affect
assessment of the precedent.  There, Ceballos, a supervising deputy district attorney,
had criticized a search warrant used in an ongoing criminal prosecution, asserting in
meetings and two inter-office memos that it was based on police misconduct.102  Alleg-
ing that his supervisors then retaliated against him for these statements, including by
failing to promote him, Ceballos claimed a violation of his free speech rights.103
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court emphasized at length public employers’
need to manage their employees effectively and efficiently.104  Characterizing the prose-
cutor’s memos as “duty-related,” and with “no relevant analogue to speech by citizens
who are not government employees,” he declined to apply the traditional Pickering bal-
ancing test.105  Pickering provides some measure of protection to a public employee’s
99 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 236 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing library’s
discretion over collection decisions, but pointing out that no one would agree that meant a
library could exclude all books criticizing Christianity) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 870–71 (1982) (plurality)); see also Schauer, supra note 89, at 114–16 (discussing
library example).
100 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009).
101 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
102 Id. at 413–14.
103 Id. at 414–16.
104 Id. at 416–21.
105 Id. at 421, 424 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). Justice Kennedy
distinguishes the lawyer’s memo to his supervisor from the letter to the newspaper written by
the Pickering plaintiff. Id. Pickering was a high school teacher, dismissed from his job after
writing a letter to the editor criticizing the school district’s handling of a bond issue and use
of tax revenue. Thus, commentators have focused on the public policy problems of providing
First Amendment protections only to those public employers who take their complaints about
management to the public, rather than attempting to address them internally.
20 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1
interest in commenting upon “matters of public concern,” balanced against the govern-
ment employer’s interest in delivering efficient public services.106  Garcetti holds that
where the public employee’s speech relates to his job, organizational needs prevail.107
Justice Souter’s dissent, in contrast, characterized the Garcetti decision as a misuse
of the government speech doctrine, based on the majority’s brief reference to “employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”108  Souter argued
that this application of Rust was wrong because: “Unlike the doctors in Rust, Ceballos
was not paid to advance one specific policy among those legitimately available, defined
by a specific message or limited by a particular message forbidden.”109  The majority
of legal commentators have interpreted Garcetti as a government speech case fol-
lowing Rust and criticized the decision.110  For example, Professor Helen Norton has
written that Garcetti goes too far, and proposed instead that government may claim
as its own—and thus control entirely exempt from First Amendment scrutiny—the
job-related speech only of those public employees that it has specifically hired to
deliver its views.111
Conversely, Professor Larry Rosenthal has argued that Garcetti serves First
Amendment values because allowing “managerial control over employee speech is
106 Id. at 417, 423–24.
107 Id. at 421–22.
108 Id. at 422. Justice Kennedy followed that statement with this citation: “Cf. Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]hen the government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what
it wishes.”).” Id. This is the line in Rosenberger where the Court described its holding in
Rust, and thus first crystalized this concept, giving rise to what is now referred to as the
government speech doctrine.
Whether Justice Kennedy intended to say that Rust applies to Garcetti, as described by
Justice Souter, see id. at 437, is less than clear. See Ira P. Robbins, Semiotics, Analogical
Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting Our Signals Crossed, 48 DUKE L.J. 1043,
1056 (1999) (examining use of the cf. signal and arguing that its careless use by judges leads
to confusing and incoherent developments in the law, and stating that “[w]hen courts use the
cf. signal, legal discourse oft[en] goes up in smoke”). The signal “cf.” is used when the “cited
authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous
to lend support.” THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 47 (Columbia
Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting). He added, while “[s]ome public employees are hired
to ‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a particular message set by the government, . . .
not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a government
manifesto.” Id.
110 See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control
of its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2009).
111 Id. at 30. Garcetti “reflect[s] a distorted understanding of government speech that over-
states government’s communicative claims to its employees’ on-duty speech while
undermining the public interest in transparent governmental speech.” Id. at 20. Under
Professor Norton’s proposed rule, other employees would continue to be governed by the
Pickering balancing test. Id. at 33–34.
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essential if [government] management is to be held politically accountable for the
performance of public institutions.”112  Rather than interpret this decision as a gov-
ernment speech case in the manner of Rust and Johanns, he described Garcetti’s
conception of “managerial control over employee speech” as growing out of what this
Article has termed the “speech selection” cases, Forbes, Finley, and American Library
Association.113  In those cases, the Court has recognized that “some institutions must
be granted a prerogative to evaluate and control the content of what would otherwise
be constitutionally protected speech if they are to achieve otherwise constitutionally
legitimate objectives.”114  In line with earlier work by Dean Robert Post and Professor
Frederick Schauer, Rosenthal proposed that the standard for these types of cases should
be “an assessment of the extent to which a challenged regulation distorts or advances
legitimate institutional objectives.”115
Thus, viewed through the lens of Johanns/Rust, Garcetti is flawed because it did
not involve an employee specifically hired for the purpose of delivering a govern-
ment policy message.116  In contrast, if seen as related to Finley, Forbes and especially
American Library Association, Garcetti is a sensible application of the doctrine allow-
ing governmental discretion to control speech content where necessary to carry out
a specific institutional function, here, that of public employer.117
D. Summarizing the Court’s Choice of “Government Speech” Paradigms
Highlights the Establishment Clause Dilemma
In sum, while the terminology and categories are somewhat blurry and interwoven,
this examination of the Court’s prior precedent highlights Summum’s transformative
112 Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008) (rejecting the scholarly consensus on Garcetti).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 52.
115 Id. at 93; see Post, supra note 79, at 167 (concluding that cases should be distinguished
based on whether they involve the domain of “public discourse” or the “managerial domain.”
Post suggested that in the latter, the proper inquiry is whether the “restraints on speech . . . are
instrumentally necessary to the attainment of legitimate managerial purposes, and those that
are not”); Schauer, supra note 89, at 119–20 (concluding that only institution-specific standards
can decide questions raised by “government enterprise free speech cases”); see also Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (proposing that
the government’s monument-selection criteria be measured by their reasonable relationship
to the various functions of a public park).
116 And thus, all three cases similarly are flawed by their lack of transparency. See supra
note 84.
117 This brief sketch of two well-developed, sharply-contrasting, scholarly articles on
Garcetti serves here only to illustrate how the choice between these two legal frameworks
can drive decisions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to weigh in on the proper scope of
public employee speech rights as a matter of policy, or to opine on Garcetti’s impact on, or
fit with, prior case law on public employment and free speech.
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doctrinal impact.  “Government speech” under Rust and Johanns commonly meant
that the government had a specific policy message, and used a private speaker to assist
in delivering it.  In other contexts, where government has a role that requires selecting
among private speakers to accomplish its particular function, it has been allowed some
editorial discretion; under that paradigm, government is not seen as using those pri-
vate speakers to deliver its own policy message.118  And when government is acting
as manager of an institution, persons speaking within that institution, and who play an
integral role in its function, may not enjoy the same free speech rights as they do when
acting as citizens in the domain of “public discourse.”119  This tripartite summary is
similar to Professor Alan Brownstein’s recent schema of the school speech cases, a
doctrinal sub-category which involves an ongoing struggle with defining public roles
and private speech rights.120
118 See supra Part I.B.
119 See Post, supra note 79, at 169.
120 Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out
of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 717 (2009) (proposing a new First Amendment category, the “nonforum,” as a more
doctrinally satisfactory method of permitting schools to perform their necessarily discretionary
government function). Summarizing existing school speech doctrine, Brownstein stated that
only teacher speech which conveys the content of courses to students can be analogized to
“government speech” under Rust. Id. at 735–36. When student speech cannot reasonably be
interpreted to express the government’s message, then the teacher’s choices regarding stu-
dent speech are better deemed “government-selected speech,” which should be free from
judicial “forum” scrutiny, by analogy to Forbes’s editorial discretion. Id. at 736–37. Finally,
Brownstein views Garcetti as providing a third rationale: just as public employers need control
over the workplace, First Amendment scrutiny of day-to-day decisions at school would inter-
fere with teachers’ need to control student speech to further school’s educational mission.
Id. at 739–40; see also Steven K. Green, All Things Not Being Equal: Reconciling Student
Religious Expression in the Public Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 843, 885 (2009) (noting
that the Court’s school cases, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), and Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), have been characterized as allowing school admin-
istrations to control student speech based on “government speech,” but that they are more
accurately viewed as involving “school-sponsored activity rather than surrogate government
speech. . . . The category of ‘school-sponsored’ expression . . . suggests that it is not purely
government speech, but rather speech that incorporates the expression of others, including their
ideas and emotions.”); Rosenthal, supra note 112, at 96 (asserting that Morse “fits comfort-
ably within the doctrinal parameters for a managerial prerogative . . . [because] the mission of
the public schools is to teach; [schools] can therefore hardly be indifferent to advocacy that
undermines their pedagogical objectives.”).
Courts deciding speech claims brought against school districts have started citing the
Johanns and Summum government speech precedent, as well as the school cases. See Griswold
v. Driscoll, 624 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 3169372 (1st Cir. 2010)
(relying in part on Summum, politically-charged change to state school board’s website, which
outlined approved curriculum, deemed a curricular decision, and thus government speech
outside the scope of Free Speech Clause challenge).
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This discourse on the state of “government speech” precedent leading up to the
Summum case serves two distinct purposes.  It provides the necessary background to
show how that doctrine has been expanded.  But perhaps more critically, this sense
of the case law provides a context for analyzing the doctrinal dilemma that is the pri-
mary focus of this Article: the interaction of government speech under the Free Speech
Clause and the Establishment Clause.
The arguments presented to the Court reflect an intricate dance around these two
pillars and the case’s religious speech subtext.  Summum’s counsel gave lip service
to retaining the Tenth Circuit’s public forum/strict scrutiny holding,121 but affirming
that position never seemed a real possibility.  Instead, Summum focused on asking the
Court to require the City to officially “adopt”—as its own—the message conveyed by
each of its donated monuments on display.122  The idea, of course, was to box the City
in to a more precarious Establishment Clause position by forcing it to claim full owner-
ship of the religious inscription on the face of its Ten Commandments monument.
The City’s response helped to frame the doctrinal choices before the Court.  At
many points in its briefs and at oral argument, Pleasant Grove’s counsel asked the
Court to find “government speech” based on Finley, Forbes, and American Library
Association, and to agree that a city acts as an editor or curator when it selects monu-
ments, so that it does not necessarily agree with any message inscribed on a displayed
monument.123  The City also noted that the message it intended to convey through
the Ten Commandments display was not the religious creed written on the monu-
ment, but a locally-significant, historical message relating to the Mormon people’s
own exodus story.124
The final introductory frame for the Summum decision is a perspective on the
Court’s complex, embattled Establishment Clause precedent.  Both the parties’ argu-
ments, and the various Justice’s rationales, can be fully understood only with this
background, which is overviewed briefly next in Part III.
121 Summum Respondent Brief, supra note 49, at 18; Summum Transcript, supra note 13,
at 44–46.
122 Summum Respondent Brief, supra note 49, at 32; Summum Transcript, supra note 13,
at 52–53.
123 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 12–13, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125
(2009) (No. 07-665) [hereinafter Summum Reply Brief] (“[G]overnment speech includes
selecting and presenting messages that the government does not necessarily itself adopt, as with
books in a library . . . speakers with contrary views in a lecture series, and so forth.”); Summum
Transcript, supra note 13, at 12, 65, passim; accord NYC Brief, supra note 3, at 12–15
(emphasizing that NYC acts as a “curator” when selecting monuments for its public parks).
124 Summum Reply Brief, supra note 123, at 11 (asserting that, while the Eagles contributed
the Ten Commandments monument as a moral code for youth, Pleasant Grove City installed
it in Pioneer Park “to remind citizens of their pioneer heritage in the founding of the state”
(quoting the Mayor at the monument’s unveiling ceremony)). Reminiscent of Moses and the
Jewish people, Brigham Young led the Mormons, members of a new religion based on stone
tablets given from God, away from persecution in Illinois, and into the desolate new land that
became the State of Utah. See U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, THE MORMON PIONEER
NATIONAL HISTORIC TRAIL, http://www.nps.gov/mopi/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BACKDROP TO THE COURT’S INTRICATE DANCE IN
SUMMUM
A. Overview of the Issue
In one sense, a large proportion of all Establishment Clause jurisprudence could
be thought of as involving claims about government religious speech, with the other
broad category relating to government aid.  Part III begins to explore what “govern-
ment speech” has meant in Establishment Clause cases, and how it relates to the “core
government speech doctrine” which is evolving as a defense in Free Speech Clause
cases.  Until very recently,125 references to government speech in Establishment Clause
cases have never stood for its antithesis: a government’s ability to declare its own
religious viewpoint.
Understanding the Summum opinions requires an introduction to the Court’s prece-
dent on religiously-themed displays, most of which involved mixed public/private
roles.  These cases primarily have used two approaches: the endorsement test, which
starts from an assumption of government neutrality toward religion, and a historical,
tradition-based view.126  Before turning to specifics, sketching some basic principles
may help show how Summum relates to Van Orden.
Establishment Clause claims in religious display cases generally require two condi-
tions: a given display conveys a religious message, and the government (usually along
with a private party) has some role.127  Correspondingly, a government defendant can
win by either of two means.  A government may be involved in an arguably religious
display, and yet defeat the Establishment Clause claim, because a court decides that the
content of the message communicated by that display is primarily secular.128  Alter-
natively, a government may avoid Establishment Clause liability, despite having some
role in an arguably religious display, if a court decides that government is neither the
“speaker” of the display’s message, nor associated with the display under circumstances
in which it appears to be endorsing the display’s religious message.129  The content and
the speaker/endorser routes to Establishment Clause compliance are disjunctive, so that
when a court determines one is met, it does not necessarily make a decision or provide
a clear holding on the other.
As further background, another range of Establishment Clause cases have involved
more clearly intentional government expression of religious messages.  The categories
125 See, e.g., Turner v. City Council, 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying four-part gov-
ernment speech test to uphold city’s nonsectarian prayer policy against claim that it violated
speaker’s right to name Jesus).
126 See infra Part III.B.
127 See infra Part III.B.
128 E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
129 E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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include: (1) school prayer130 and school curriculum,131 (2) benedictions and invoca-
tions, including at schools132 and legislative bodies,133 and (3) symbols such as the
national motto, “In God We Trust,”134 and the inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge
of Allegiance.135
To summarize broadly, as the law currently stands, where a message communi-
cated by the government is deemed primarily religious, generally the Establishment
Clause is violated.136  In a second category, religious phrases that could be character-
ized as constitutive of a government’s identity, several Justices’ opinions have sug-
gested allowing them under the guise of “ceremonial deism.”137  Frequently justified by
claims that the brief, solemnizing words have minimal religious content and function
as rote civic exercises, this rationale can be viewed as functionally equivalent to finding
a secular message.138
130 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding daily prayer at public schools
unconstitutional).
131 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding required teaching of creation
science at public school unconstitutional).
132 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invocations before high
school football game violated endorsement test); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(invocation before middle school graduation violated coercion test).
133 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upheld state legislative chaplain based
on history and tradition).
134 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 716 (2005) (assuming constitutionality of “In
God We Trust”).
135 See Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 52 U.S. 1, 38 (O’Connor, J., concurring in dis-
missal on standing grounds of challenge to words “under God” in Pledge of Allegiance).
136 See infra notes 145–47. Much of the precedent clearly supporting this broad general
principle, however, is skewed by its source in the school context, where the Court is generally
more careful due to the susceptibility of young students. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (“As we have
observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”). But see also infra
Part III.B (discussing the religious display cases).
137 See, e.g., Newdow, 52 U.S. at 37–42 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“ceremonial deism”
features include long use, nonsectarian, minimal religious content, especially no prayer or
worship); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dismissing
such phrases from Establishment Clause scrutiny as a form of “‘ceremonial deism’ . . . chiefly
because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content”). For two recent
comprehensive analyses of ceremonial deism, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism
and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545 (2010) [hereinafter Corbin,
Ceremonial Deism]; B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism
and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2010) [hereinafter Hill, Of Christmas
Trees and Corpus Christi]. See also Stephen B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996).
138 See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“I believe that although these references speak in the language of religious
belief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essentially secular pur-
poses.”). School children’s daily recitation of the words “under God,” added to the Pledge of
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A competing theme of historical practice and original intent, however, is found in
some plurality and dissenting opinions, discussed below in Part III.B, and in the anoma-
lous case of legislative prayer.  In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court upheld state funding
of a Christian legislative chaplain, who regularly offered prayers before legislative
sessions, based on the Framers’ practice at the time of enacting the Bill of Rights.139
Thus far, legislative prayer is an Establishment Clause exception: it is the only
context in which the Court has permitted prayer as a regularly-occurring government
practice.  Now it has become the lower court testing grounds for use of the “govern-
ment speech” defense at the intersection of the Establishment Clause and the Free
Speech Clause.140  Recent scholarship has detailed the jarring results, which seem to
be directly at odds with core principles of neutrality and religious liberty.141  While
the ongoing, interactive nature of legislative prayer does multiply and exacerbate the
conflicts, the current spate of litigation sheds some light on the difficulties ahead if,
after Summum, religious monuments are both protected by the “government speech
doctrine” from sharing the stage with competing viewpoints, but still are held com-
pliant with the Establishment Clause.
B. Analysis of Context and Signs in the Court’s Religious Display Cases
This analysis of the Court’s religious display cases focuses on the three variables
which are most relevant to the endorsement inquiry and significant to appreciating
Allegiance in 1954, seems a poor fit with more infrequent and passive forms of “ceremonial
deism,” but the opinion explains the concept well. Id. at 35–39.
139 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 789, 792 (upholding Nebraska legislature’s paid chap-
lain against an Establishment Clause challenge “[i]n light of the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years,” and emphasizing that Congress reached final agreement on
the language of the Bill of Rights on September 25, 1789, three days after authorizing the
appointment of paid legislative chaplains).
140 For a particularly troublesome recent case, see Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 937 (2005) (rejecting
excluded Wiccan’s free speech and free exercise claims regarding monotheist legislative
prayer policy on grounds that legislative prayer is government speech, so that government
is free to enlist private speakers to convey its preferred prayer content).
141 See, e.g., Christopher Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010) (including a comprehensive collection of cases
and news articles regarding recent conflicts); see also Bernadette Meyler, Summum and
the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 101 (2009), http://www.law
.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRColl2009n32Meyler.pdf (using a legislative
prayer decision, Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003), to illustrate the funda-
mental contradictions between the “tradition” standard, the Establishment Clause neutrality
principle, and the emerging government speech doctrine); Robert Luther III & David B.
Caddell, Breaking Away From the “Prayer Police”: Why the First Amendment Permits
Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands a “Practice-Focused” Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 569 (2008); Robert J. Delahunty, “Varied Carols”: Legislative Prayer in a
Pluralistic Polity, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 517 (2007).
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Summum: (1) government ownership—of both land/building and challenged religious
symbol; (2) labeling signs—including both signs explaining the display’s purpose, and
those that indicate the private party’s role; and (3) the general context—both physical
and conceptual.  It shows that the overall context trumps all; that who owned what has
not been a critical factor in the analysis; and that if government favoritism toward (or
viewpoint about) religion is conveyed clearly enough by the context, then even prior
to Summum, a donor plaque alone lacked mitigating value.
Starting with the endorsement test, it was first proposed by Justice O’Connor in
her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,142 a holiday display case, and then adopted
by the majority opinion in a similar case, County of Allegheny v. ACLU.143  Stated
generally, the test inquires whether a reasonable observer, viewing the display in its
context, would understand the challenged display of a religious symbol as sending
a message of government endorsement of religion.144  The endorsement test “asks
the right question,” Justice O’Connor reasoned, because “[t]he Establishment Clause
prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person’s standing in the political community.”145  According to her familiar explanation:
“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members of the political community.”146  Originally, she described
it as a clarification of the then-predominant Lemon test, which requires that govern-
ments’ actions have a secular purpose and not have a primary effect that advances
or inhibits religion.147
In the two seasonal displays that satisfied the endorsement test, their overall
physical appearance was deemed to emphasize the festive, secular component of
the holidays.  First, in Lynch v. Donnelly, while the plurality upheld the City of
Pawtucket’s display of a crèche on historical grounds,148 Justice O’Connor wrote
separately to emphasize that the City had not endorsed Christianity by including the
crèche in its regular holiday display, where it also had included a Santa Claus house,
reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh,149 a Christmas tree, carolers, large toys, and a large
banner stating “Seasons Greetings.”150  And a few years later, in Allegheny, the Court
142 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
143 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
144 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 688.
147 Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1979)). Note that Lemon’s third
prong, which prohibited excessive government entanglement with religion, was subsumed
into the “primary effect” inquiry in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
148 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677–78 (plurality opinion) (finding that the crèche “depicts the histor-
ical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday,” and the country’s
history is “replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance”).
149 Id. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
150 Id. at 670 (plurality opinion).
28 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1
held that the City of Pittsburgh’s display of an 18-foot Hanukkah menorah outside the
city-county building did not endorse the Jewish religion, where it was placed next to
a 45-foot Christmas tree and a sign bearing the mayor’s name and the words, “Salute
to Liberty.”151
In both of these holdings, the focus was on the content of the message conveyed
by the crèche and the menorah, given the overall setting, especially the surrounding
objects.152  Significantly, there was no constitutional meaning attributed to the fact that
the two displays involved two contrasting ownership scenarios.  Once the content was
deemed secular, the Court did not separate out the speakers’ identities.  In Lynch,
the city owned all the display items, including the crèche, while the display itself was
located on a private park near the shopping district.153  Justice O’Connor found that
this commercial location further supported finding a secular message, but did not sug-
gest that the display’s message could then be attributed to the private land owner.154 
In Allegheny, that the menorah was owned by Chabad, a Jewish organization, although
stored and erected by the city on a plaza outside of city hall, was not a part of the
Court’s analysis.
In the second situation, where the message conveyed by a display is deemed
religious, closer scrutiny is given to the identity of the speaker.  In the other challenged
display in Allegheny, the County had displayed a crèche, unaccompanied by any dis-
tracting secular objects, on the prominent Grand Staircase of the county building.155 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that any viewer would understand that
by showing such special favor towards one religion’s symbol, the County was pro-
moting the crèche’s religious message, including the words of its inscription, “Glory
to God in the Highest.”156  Given this unique treatment, the outcome was not altered
by the private speaker’s role or by the sign stating: “This Display is Donated by the
Holy Name Society.”157
In a third situation, where the Court determines that a private speaker’s challenged
religious display would not be attributed to the government, then it does not need to
resolve any arguments regarding the primary content of the message.  In Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,158 the Court held that the State of Ohio
had violated the Ku Klux Klan’s free speech rights by rejecting the Klan’s request
to display a large Latin cross on the statehouse plaza during the December holiday
151 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 582 (1989).
152 Id.; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677–78.
153 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
154 Id. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
155 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 580. “On the contrary, the sign simply demonstrates that the government is endors-
ing the religious message of that organization, rather than communicating a message of its own.
But the Establishment Clause does not limit only the religious content of the government’s
own communications.” Id. at 600.
158 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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season.  The State had claimed that permitting such a display would violate the
Establishment Clause.  The plurality categorically stated that private religious speech
in a public forum can never violate the Establishment Clause, regardless of public
perception.159  At least in that case, though, five Justices continued to support the
endorsement test, with some differences in approach.160
In Pinette, Justice O’Connor refined her description of the “reasonable observer,”
as one who “must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and
forum in which the religious display appears.”161  There, the reasonably informed ob-
server would know that Capitol Square had been used over time by numerous private
speakers of various types.162  And, most significantly here, the concurring Justices
stressed the importance of affixing to the cross an adequate disclaimer sign, “suffi-
ciently large and clear,” to prevent any inference that the government endorsed the
Klan’s cross.163  As Justice O’Connor described it, the Establishment Clause “imposes
affirmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to
avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message.”164 
Given this conclusion of “no government endorsement,” the Court did not resolve
Justice Thomas’s argument that the Establishment Clause was not even implicated
because the content of the Klan’s cross’s allegedly religious message instead had a
primarily political message of white supremacy.165
Most significant to any analysis of Summum’s government speech holding, is the
factually-similar Van Orden v. Perry.166  The 5-4 decision upheld the Texas display
of an Eagles-donated Ten Commandments monument, which was located between
the State Capitol and Supreme Court building, on the 22-acre Capitol grounds which
159 Id. at 770 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Thomas, & Kennedy, JJ.).
160 Id. at 772 (O’Connor, Souter & Breyer, JJ.); id. at 799 (Stevens, J.); id. at 817–18
(Ginsberg, J.).
161 Id. at 779–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (proposing a “hypothetical observer” that is
not based on the “the actual perception of individual observers,” but instead “is similar to the
‘reasonable person’ in tort law”); see also id. at 801–02 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that
the “reasonable observer” will assume that the government has endorsed the message of any
unattended display located in front of its capitol).
162 Id. at 781–82 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring) (basing his concurrence “in large part” on the con-
dition that “the Klan attach a disclaimer sufficiently large and clear to preclude any reason-
able inference” that the government was endorsing Christianity); id. at 782 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (assuming an adequate disclaimer, found that a reasonable observer would con-
clude that Klan cross in public forum was private speech). Contra id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (based in part on the inadequacy of the disclaimer sign used: it “was unsturdy; it did
not identify the Klan as sponsor; it failed to state unequivocally that Ohio did not endorse the
display’s message; and it was not shown to be legible from a distance”).
164 Id. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
165 Id.
166 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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contained seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers.167  The 6-foot
high, 3.5-foot wide monolith displayed the Decalogue, with the first line in larger
lettering (“I AM the LORD thy GOD”) and bearing a simple donor plaque, which
states only: “Presented to the People and Youth of Texas by the Fraternal Order of
Eagles of Texas 1961.”168
The plurality opinion, written by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined by
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, relied on the long history of “[r]ecognition of
the role of God in our Nation’s heritage” and “acknowledgements of the role played
by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”169  The plurality concluded that
the display did not violate the Establishment Clause after stating the following: “Texas
has treated its Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands in the
State’s political and legal history.  The inclusion of the Ten Commandments in this
group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government.”170
The four dissenters, Justices Souter, O’Connor, Stevens, and Ginsburg (only two
of whom remain on the Court) found the display unconstitutional because it declares
God’s commands to all who walk on the sidewalk to the Texas Supreme Court, with
no mediating explanation other than the donor plaque, and accompanied only by other
statues which are spread over a large grounds, and unreadable when facing the Ten
Commandments.171  Because the display lacks any attempt to provide an historical
context or to explain its connection to the development of rules of law, they con-
cluded, it conveys only the unconstitutional message of government endorsement
of the particular religious creed it expounds.172
Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence also applied a version of the endorsement
test, seasoned by his “legal judgment.”173  To find endorsement, he used two main
167 Id. at 681.
168 Id. at 681–82; id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 687–88.
170 Id. at 691–92. This opinion also distinguished an earlier case finding a classroom display
of the Ten Commandments unconstitutional, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), on the
grounds that it was justified by the special vigilance the Court has shown in the elementary
and secondary schools. Id. at 690–91.
It should be noted that the background facts quote the authorizing legislation, which refers
to Texan identity, but that language was not discussed by the plurality. See id. at 681 (quoting
Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. 2001) (monuments are to commemorate the “‘people, ideals
and events that compose Texan identity’”).
171 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 737 (Souter, J., dis-
senting, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg); id. at 717 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined
by Justice Ginsburg).
The Texas Ten Commandments, which visually emphasizes the religious commands, is
located facing the sidewalk between the Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court, only 123 feet
from the Court, and the closest other monuments are blocked from view by hedges. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 9–10 (2005).
172 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737.
173 Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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factors to conclude that this Ten Commandments display conveys a predominantly
secular message.174  One was the physical setting, including the other monuments and
markers, which he concluded illustrated Texas history and moral ideals.175
The essential point here, though, is that Justice Breyer relied on the donor
plaque to shift some responsibility away from the State.  “The tablets, as displayed
on the monument, prominently acknowledge that the Eagles donated the display, a
factor which, though not sufficient, thereby further distances the State itself from the
religious aspects of the Commandments’ message.”176  Because the Eagles “sought to
highlight the Commandments’ role in shaping civic morality as part of that organiza-
tion’s efforts to combat juvenile delinquency,” he reasoned, the park’s other monuments
“together with the display’s inscription about its origin” communicates that the State
intended the moral message to predominate.177  Federal courts have relied on this por-
tion of Breyer’s opinion in upholding some public Ten Commandments monuments.178
The determinative fact for Justice Breyer on this “borderline” case was his concern
over “religiously-based divisiveness.”179  He balanced the statue’s forty years without
legal challenge against the risk of numerous disputes if the Court’s decision led to “re-
moval of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings
174 Id. at 701–02.
175 Id.
176 Id. (emphasis added).
177 Id.
178 See Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (Eagles Ten Commandments
monument on land near former city hall, and near other monuments, did not violate Establish-
ment Clause). There, the Ninth Circuit noted that the monument “bears a prominent inscription
showing that it was donated to the City by a private organization,” and concluded from that
fact: “As in Van Orden, this serves to send a message to viewers that, while the monument
sits on public land, it did not sprout from the minds of City officials and was not funded from
City coffers.” Id. at 1020. The court relied here on Justice Breyer’s statement in Van Orden that
“[t]he presence of the graven dedication from the Eagles on the face of the monument ‘further
distances the State itself from the religious aspect of the Commandments’ message.’” Id. at
1019 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring)); Twombly v. City
of Fargo, 388 F.Supp.2d 983 (D. N.D. 2005) (Ten Commandments monument on city-owned
land facing city hall and other public buildings did not violate Establishment Clause, despite
absence of other surrounding monuments). In Twombly, the court stated:
Justice Breyer suggested that this inscription served to distance the State
from the religious aspects of the monument’s message. . . . The fact
that an inscription exists evincing private sponsorship serves to weigh
against the probability that the religious message will be attributed to
the state. . . . Justice Breyer’s note of the Texas display’s acknowl-
edgment of its private origin presumably makes it more likely that the
speech will not be attributed to the government and therefore cannot
convey a message that the state deems a non-adherent a political or
social outsider.
Id. at 990.
179 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring).
32 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1
across the Nation.”180  His opinion, therefore, may not extend to new monuments,
especially where it is their initial installation which causes division and litigation.181
To complete the picture, Part III of this Article closes with the other 2005 Ten
Commandments case, McCreary County v. ACLU,182 where Justice Souter’s opinion
for the Court held that the Ten Commandments displays inside several Kentucky
courthouses violated the Establishment Clause because of the governments’ religious
purpose.183  According to the 5-4 majority, this improper purpose was demonstrated
by the current display’s immediate history: the officials had started out with a cam-
paign to post the Ten Commandments, standing alone, in all county courtrooms, and
had added the “remarkably transparent fig leaf” of surrounding documents only in
response to Establishment Clause litigation.184
One part of Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas and
then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, repudiated the very process of analyzing governmental
motivation.185  The dissent found a secular purpose based on considering only the third
and final version, where the Ten Commandments was accompanied by other docu-
ments, including the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of
Rights, and also displayed a written explanation stating: “The Ten Commandments
provide the moral background of the Declaration of Independence and the foundation
of our legal tradition.”186  Many have pointed out the weakness in claiming a sectarian
religious code, which proscribes allegiance to one conception of God, as the basis for
a constitutional system that protects individual religious liberty.187
180 Id.
181 See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Commr’s, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010) (new Ten Commandments monument erected on courthouse
lawn, initiated for religious reasons, legally challenged within the year, and supported by public
religious rallies, violated the Establishment Clause) (discussed supra Part V). But see Green v.
Haskell Cty. Bd. of Commr’s, 574 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting from denial
of petition for reh’g en banc) (rejecting idea that result should turn on whether the govern-
ment Ten Commandments display was erected recently and challenged promptly, or erected
decades ago, in an era where such displays were not typically challenged as Establishment
Clause violations).
182 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
183 Id. at 881.
184 Id. at 904–07; see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 141, 143 (2007) (discussed infra Part V) (using “fig leaf”
metaphor to convey the difference between the Kentucky displays, where “everything
besides the Ten Commandments was an afterthought, and the linkage among them was
obscure,” and the Supreme Court frieze, which depicts Moses and the tablets in an
“immediately recognizable . . . coherent composition, ‘great lawgivers,’” and de-emphasizes
the religious aspects).
185 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 912 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 856 (majority opinion).
187 See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGAR, supra note 184, at 141 (noting that our Constitution
is different because it does not require worshiping God, and that our laws do not prohibit purely 
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In the more dramatic section of the McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia, accompanied
by only one current member of the Court, Justice Thomas, argued that the Constitution
allows, and even contemplates, governmental preference for religion over irreligion.188 
Justice Scalia went further, and asserted the constitutionality of government express-
ing a preference for monotheism; indeed, he made the polemical claim that 97.7% of
the believers in the United States are Christian, Jewish, or Islamic, and “believe that
the Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for
a virtuous life.”189  Thus, he argued, for the government to honor the Ten Command-
ments is the constitutional equivalent of honoring God, and so does not violate the
Establishment Clause.190
Returning to the present decision, in analyzing the Free Speech claim presented
in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, it seems apparent that the Justices kept in mind
how their decision in Summum would affect the Court’s prior precedent on reli-
gious symbols—and their own preferred vision of the Establishment Clause’s
essential meaning.
To summarize, at the time the Justices worked through the interlocking doctrines
implicated by the facts in Summum, the Establishment Clause backdrop included the
following competing approaches: (1) the fact-intensive endorsement test championed
by the departed Justice O’Connor; (2) Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment” test, which
adds to endorsement-style analysis a political concern for increasing religious divisive-
ness; (3) the Lemon test and its “secular purpose” prong (at least given clear evidence
of government officials’ intent to promote religion); (4) the “basic” historical approach,
which relies on sometimes sweeping generalizations to support some public religion;
and (5) Justice Scalia’s sectarian monotheist historical approach, which abandons any
pretense of neutrality.  When Summum was decided, Justice Breyer’s approach con-
trolled.  The open question is whether the Roberts’s Court will shift the Establishment
spiritual sins, such as coveting); Chemerinsky, supra note 171, at 5–6 (noting that the first
four commandments are religious commands, several others bear no relation to American
law, and those that do are common to all cultures) (citations omitted); Paul Finkelman, The
Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477,
1516 (2005).
Steven Goldberg also has raised the interesting point that the Ten Commandments include
proclamations that arguably were superseded by Jesus’s teachings. See GOLDBERG, supra
note 25, at 14–18 (comparing, “I the LORD . . . am a jealous God, visiting the inequity of
the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; and
shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me,” with Jesus’s law of love, and require-
ments of forgiveness).
188 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 885–87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that while Justice Kennedy
failed to join Justice Scalia’s extreme version of nonpreferentialism, elsewhere he has sup-
ported the milder, traditional version and rejected the endorsement test for passive symbols.
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 673 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 Id.
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Clause paradigm for government-sponsored speech—from a search for neutrality, to
an originalism which purports to allow government endorsement of religion.191
IV. DECONSTRUCTING THE COURT’S RATIONALES
Drawing the line between private speech facilitated by government, and govern-
ment speech effectuated through private speakers, is inherently difficult.192  When
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, set forth the affirmative case for applying the gov-
ernment speech doctrine, he based this holding on two main principles: (1) govern-
ments intend to convey some message when displaying privately-donated monuments
in public parks; and (2) viewers attribute such monuments’ expression to the govern-
ment.193  Part IV.A both presents and critiques the opinion; in particular, it shows how
this rationale is fundamentally incompatible with the postmodern idea, arguably also
expressed by Justice Alito, that monuments have undefined, unlimited meanings. 
In addition, Part IV.B critiques the opinion’s negative case for why forum analysis
is unworkable here, and demonstrates how this part of the opinion, too, relies on the
need for government to express its viewpoints through monuments.  Finally, Part IV.C
addresses all the opinions relating to the lurking Establishment Clause issue, in-
cluding Justice Alito’s segment on meaning, and the direct discussions found in the
concurrences by Justice Scalia and Justice Souter.
A. The Establishment Clause Significance of the Case for Government Speech
The Summum opinion starts by setting forth the transformative impact of defining
a challenged private-public expression as government speech: “A government entity
may exercise [its general] freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from
private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.”194  As
mentioned, the government speech doctrine is applied here based on government’s
191 Compare, e.g., Andrew Koppleman, Phony Originalism & the Establishment Clause,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2009) (arguing that Justice Rehnquist’s nonpreferentialism and
Justice Scalia’s biblical monotheism misstate history), with Patrick M. Garry, Religious
Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential
Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (arguing from history that “the framers
intended to promote religious exercise in the public sector”).
192 The binary approach is so unworkable that recently, some commentators have argued
to abandon it. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 120 (advocating treating school-related speech
as a nonforum); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008) (arguing for treating such “mixed speech” as its
own First Amendment category); see also Schauer, supra note 89 (advocating an “institutional”
approach to the private/governmental speech questions).
193 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
194 Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).
2010] GOVERNMENT IDENTITY SPEECH AND RELIGION 35
communicative intent and viewers’ attribution—which both resonate with Establish-
ment Clause analysis.  In addition, the decision’s appeal and unanimity are bolstered
by the fact that, in this context, finding government speech does not undermine, and
sometimes promotes, First Amendment values.
1. The Opinion Emphasized Government’s Intent to Send a Message
The finding of governmental expressive intent in Summum rested on a number
of factors, all of which have broad applicability to the other expressive contexts that
are now percolating through the courts.195  To start, monuments are an inherently
expressive context; here, this is bolstered by the long tradition of governments using
monuments “to speak to the public.”196  Thus, regardless of whether a government
commissions a monument, or displays a privately-financed or -initiated monument,
the Court stated, “it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some
feeling in those who see the structure.”197
The opinion’s second, and most significant, point on the requirement of govern-
ment’s expressive intent echoed this focus on content.  The Court concluded that
Pleasant Grove’s monuments were “government speech” in part because “[t]he City
has selected those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park . . . .”198 
Combined with the first point, government’s intent to instill a feeling or convey a
thought when deciding to display a monument, the Summum decision clearly adopted
the idea that the “government speech doctrine” encompasses broad identity messages,
and not just specific written policy points.199
195 For instance, there is a Circuit split in the specialty license plate cases. Compare ACLU
v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “Choose Life” specialty plates are gov-
ernment speech) (minority view) with Choose Life v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009) (holding that specialty license plates are private speech).
196 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1134 (emphasis added); see also IMLA Brief, supra note 3, at 12–13 (Municipal
Practice Examples provided in the IMLA Brief showed “how governments’ decisions regarding
whose lives to honor [with monuments], and how they should be portrayed, express community
ideals at the time of installation”); Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 29 & n.131 (concluding,
based on IMLA survey, that “[e]ven where a donated monument lacks a specific expressive
message, however, as with an abstract sculpture, municipalities still make an affirmative
decision regarding whether the broad thematic message conveyed by the offered monument
is consistent with that municipality’s broad identity messages,” which often can be gleaned
from its public promotional statements, including on municipal websites); Dolan 2004, supra
note 7, at 111–12 (based on experience counseling municipalities, showing how in analogous
public-private expressive contexts, such as some street light pole banner and special events
programs, “a government is communicating its own views on the city’s identity and purposes,
what will draw tourists and investments, and what image it should present to the larger world”).
199 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (noting that display of monuments in park “linked to the
City’s identity” also signals the City’s intent to speak through such monuments). Because I
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Third, a government must affirmatively decide whether to accept a donated monu-
ment and install it in a public park.  In doing so, the Court observed, it generally exer-
cises selectivity.200  The reason provided by Justice Alito to explain this selectivity is
an argument that is made regularly, with sporadic success, in many cases where the
government speech defense has been asserted.201  It is because property owners are un-
likely to permit installation on their property of “permanent monuments that convey a
message with which they do not wish to be associated.”202  Finally, even where private
donors created a monument, the Court held that the linchpin of government speech was
present because “the City . . . ‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent by the monu-
ments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”203
Note how the Summum Court’s statement on the required government control
modified the guidance given in Johanns, which specified that the federal government
controlled “every word” of the challenged beef advertisements.204  “Final approval
authority” arguably is implicit in the very fact of installation in a public park.  This
broader standard for content control appears to lower the bar for government speech in
order to comport with the realities of the monument context, which is far less system-
atic than the government-funded programs previously analyzed.  Summum’s broad
rationale thus is sufficient coverage for the many government entities which have exer-
cised only informal control over monument selection, or lack any proof of specific con-
trol, decades or more after the fact.205  In contrast, note that without specific written
view the Summum opinion as based on the City’s expressive intent, the expressive context of
monuments, and viewers’ consequent attribution of monuments to the government, I conclude
that Summum cannot fairly be used to assert a “government speech” defense when excluding
private speakers from meeting rooms. See Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s
Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 54
(2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund
.pdf (interpreting Summum as based on government selectivity, and suggesting that “in theory,
if [a school district] is selective enough, then at some point its determination of which clubs can
meet in its building after school looks like government speech, thereby making it constitu-
tionally immune to any Free Speech challenge”).
200 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
201 See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000);
Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000).
202 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133.
203 Id. (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005)). On this
point, Justice Alito appeared to approve a variety of methods to demonstrate such “final approval
authority.” See id. at 1133 (quoting IMLA Brief, supra note 3, at 21) (IMLA survey documented
municipalities’ editorial control through “prior submission requirements, design input, requested
modifications, written criteria, and legislative approvals of specific content proposals”).
204 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 561.
205 An alternative, or additional, account for this modification is as an effort to shield
governments from the Establishment Clause impact of strong, unambiguous ties to each
word of the content of their monuments, religious and otherwise. See infra note 271 and
accompanying text.
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criteria or, minimally, consistent past practice, a government would be unable to
establish a limited public forum.206
2. The Court’s Focus on Observers’ Attribution of Monuments to the City
Echoes the Establishment Clause Endorsement Test
Turning next to the attribution point, in order to determine speaker identity, the
Court in Summum relied on endorsement test-style analysis.207  This opinion demon-
strated, but did not expressly point out, that monuments satisfy the transparency require-
ment.  Transparency has been advocated by a number of legal scholars as essential to
proving that a given context comports with the political accountability rationale, which
is the underlying justification for the government speech doctrine.208  From the out-
set, the Court’s opinion relied heavily on the factual assumption that: “persons who
observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying
some message on the property owner’s behalf.  In this context, there is little chance
that observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker.”209
This attribution point is developed most fully in the extended response to
Summum’s repeated concern: that the government speech doctrine could be used “as
a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.”210 
In an effort to turn up the Establishment Clause heat, Summum had argued that any
government relying on the doctrine should be required to publicly adopt each donated
monument’s message through a formal resolution process.211  As shown below, in re-
jecting this proposal, the Court’s layered response goes beyond rejecting this demand.
To begin, the Court held that the City’s actions—taking ownership and putting the
monument on permanent display in a park “that is linked to the City’s identity. . . .
provided a more dramatic form of adoption . . . unmistakably signifying to all Park
visitors that the City intends the monument to speak on its behalf.”212  Consequently,
206 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (enforcing “commercial
only” transit advertising policy based on twenty-six years of consistently-enforced limit); Dolan
2004, supra note 7, at 80–83 (collecting cases).
207 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131–36.
208 E.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
983 (2005); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 101 (2008).
209 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133; see also IMLA Brief, supra note 3, at 17–18; Dolan
2008, supra note 7, at 32 (IMLA Municipal Practice Examples showed that citizens complain
to, and take action against, the administration when they dislike a monument’s message, thus
demonstrating that donated monuments are attributed to the government and satisfy the political
accountability rationale for government speech).
210 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. Note that the response centered on the “subterfuge” aspect
because, of course, favoring particular viewpoints is the very essence of recognizing govern-
ment speech.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
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the proposed ritual—a formal resolution adopting the previously-donated monument—
would serve no additional communicative purpose.  The critical language here is the
expressed recognition that the reasonable observer understands—based on the con-
textual clues of the park location and the nature of monuments—that park monuments
express a government’s identity message.213
In contrast, Summum does not make actual legal ownership of the disputed struc-
ture an essential criterion for a finding of government speech.  Indeed, Justice Alito
explicitly acknowledged that Pleasant Grove City owned most, but not all, of the Park
displays.214  The opinion did not, however, ascribe a different doctrinal status to those
Park displays to which the donor retains title, or remand the case to determine these
ownership facts.215  The Court’s approach thus declined to adopt the more specific
interpretation of “ownership” used in the Circuit Courts’ four-factor government
speech test.216  Instead, it applied a broader contextual approach, similar to the one
used in Establishment Clause cases to find that the government was endorsing a
private donor’s religious message.217
In the monument context, the land’s status as a public park more reliably signals
to observers (who will not, of course, have instant access to transfer documentation)
that a governmental entity is responsible for the monument and its expressive con-
tent.  Thus, the opinion focused on ownership of the real property on which the donated
monument is located.  The extent to which this aspect of Summum will apply to other
contexts, however, is not clear: it can be explained away as a simple acknowledgment
of the reality of how monuments are accumulated over time.  To require, as a con-
dition of the government speech defense, that a government provide documentation
of a donor’s transfer of legal title to a monument frequently would present an insur-
mountable practical obstacle in a context where many donations occurred decades, or
213 The Summum opinions’ reliance on viewer attribution of the monuments to the gov-
ernment, and not to the donors, leads me to disagree with Professor Scott Gaylord’s contrary
interpretation of the case in a recent article. See Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially Religious
Government Speech: Summum’s Impact on the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses 64
(Elon Univ. L. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-10, 2009), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1463335 (asserting that Summum’s use of the “control test,” which he appears
to view as the newly exclusive criterion for government speech, “precludes application of
the endorsement test to facially religious government speech” (emphasis added)); see also
infra Part IV.C.1 (for discussion of J. Souter’s concurrence, and federal courts’ post-Summum
use of endorsement analysis).
214 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
215 Id. at 1136.
216 See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding
the fourth factor, “ultimate responsibility,” satisfied based on city’s title to the monument,
and finding the third factor, “literal speaker,” mixed because city owned monument, but
Eagles composed speech); see supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (describing the four-
factor test).
217 See supra Part III (discussion of ownership in Allegheny).
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even centuries, ago.218  Alternatively, the Court’s approach to ownership can be ex-
plained more strategically, as the prequel to a holding for the government in Salazar
v. Buono, where a private party then would own the land beneath the challenged
memorial cross.219
The Court proffered three additional reasons for rejecting Summum’s “adopt the
monument” proposal.  The process of requiring this additional, formal legislative action
was rejected as completely impractical given the thousands of donated monuments
around in the country and the myriad jurisdictions which would have to undertake this
“pointless exercise.”220  Another justification was directed less at the “subterfuge” point,
and more at the underlying concern expressed by several Justices at oral argument:
characterizing donated monuments as “government speech” appears inconsistent with
the basic First Amendment principle against governments “favoring certain private
speakers over others based on viewpoint.”221  In response, the Court noted briefly that
there were no allegations of any attempts by the City to interfere with the exercise
of the traditional forms of protected expression in Pioneer Park (such as speech and
leafleting), by Summum or anyone else.222  Thus, this response seems to suggest, giv-
ing governments control of park monuments’ content does not result in any pervasive
disfavoring of speakers or views, but instead is limited to one specific, intentional
mode of government expression.
The above rationales appear sufficient, especially collectively, to justify rejection
of Respondent’s “adoption” request; nonetheless, the opinion continued with a lengthy
analysis of the indeterminacy of monuments’ messages.  Justice Alito questioned
Summum’s apparent assumption that “a monument can convey only one ‘message,’”
and concluded instead that a “monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may
in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”223  Given that the
Court’s religious display cases have focused on the secular message which is con-
veyed along with the religious one, Justice Alito’s extensive discussion of this point
218 See Dolan 2008, supra note 7 (discussing the IMLA Survey).
219 This distinction—between ownership of the land versus ownership of the monument
itself—has become a critical issue for the Establishment Clause analysis in Salazar v. Buono.
See discussion of Buono, infra at Part V.D.3.
220 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (“Requiring all
of these jurisdictions to go back and proclaim formally that they adopt all of these monu-
ments as their own expressive vehicles would be a pointless exercise that the Constitution
does not mandate.”).
221 Id. at 1134.
222 Id. at 1135; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Nat’l Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, and the Court’s statements in the arts funding context that it was the
suppression of disfavored views, rather than selections expressing preferred views, that would
create the clear constitutional violation); Dolan 2004, supra note 7, at 116–18 (arguing that
both core government speech and speech selection should be unconstitutional if the impact
of a governmental denial would tend to suppress a disfavored viewpoint altogether).
223 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.
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appears to relate more to future Establishment Clause challenges, and so will be
described and analyzed fully below in Part IV.C.
To summarize a bit at this juncture, though, his long riff on meaning most clearly
establishes that what the government means to express by a monument’s display is not
necessarily consistent with the donor’s intended message.  To the extent his claim
is broader, and seeks to establish that monuments’ meanings are indeterminable, and
unknown even to the government administrations which decide to display them, that
claim appears fundamentally irreconcilable with the Summum opinion’s many state-
ments describing how governments use monuments (regardless of provenance) to
express messages of which they approve and which are consistent with the public
image the polity seeks to present.
B. Critique of the Court’s Stated Reasons for Rejecting Forum Analysis
The Summum opinion’s argument for why forum analysis should not apply to
decisions on monument donations for public parks does not stand alone as a second,
independent justification for its outcome.  Instead, and perhaps inevitably, it circles
back to the affirmative case for government speech: ultimately, it relies on the need
for viewpoint in monument display.  Part IV.B demonstrates this point in part through
comparison with the neutral, constitutional policies for distribution of scarce space
for common First Amendment uses in both traditional and limited public forums. 
In addition, it shows how the opinion may exacerbate confusion in First Amendment
doctrine because it lumps together existing forum categories, without clear acknowl-
edgment, and then appears to claim that the dividing line between government speech
and public forums rests on the number of speakers.224
The Court’s focus on numbers began with this proclamation of the governing
rule: “The forum doctrine has been applied in situations in which government-owned
property or a government program was capable of accommodating a large number of
public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or the program.”225 
Support for this proposition included the claim that in the following prior precedent,
which upheld government-created limited forums, hundreds of groups could be
accommodated: (1) the annual campaign that allowed a limited number of direct-
service charitable organizations to solicit donations from federal employees,226 and
(2) the university policy that provided meeting room space for student organizations.227
These examples are puzzling, though; large numbers, per se, provide little guid-
ance.  To the contrary, New York City’s amicus brief showed that some governments
224 See Hamilton Blog, supra note 3, at 4 (concluding that Summum left all the related
First Amendment doctrines involved “muddier than ever before”).
225 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137 (emphasis added).
226 Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(using the term nonpublic forum)).
227 Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (using the term “designated” public
forum); see supra note 59 (for a discussion of terminology issue).
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can accommodate large numbers of donated monuments.228  Not only are there some
1200 monuments in Central Park, but the city annually processes hundreds of new
proposals from private donors proposing public art installations.229
More importantly, every day, smaller governmental entities dole out limited public
meeting room space that can accommodate only a small number of private users.230 
Where the number of requests from groups which satisfy the reasonable content limita-
tions (e.g., local civic, educational, or charitable purposes) exceeds the space available,
the constitutional default rule is to assign available slots based on neutral procedures,
such as first-in-time or lottery.231  Indeed, this observed rule would apply to the
Court’s own example of a permanent monument situation where forum analysis would
apply: a permanent monument where all the town residents could inscribe a private
message.232  As the population grew, and this hypothetical stone obelisk or memorial
brick area ran out of space, exclusion of later applicants would not violate limited
public forum principles.
Turning to its application to public park space, the Court reasoned:
A public park, over the years, can provide a soapbox for a very
large number of orators—often, for all who want to speak—but it
is hard to imagine how a public park could be opened up for the
installation of permanent monuments by every person or group
wishing to engage in that form of expression.233
No one could dispute the fact that any particular public park must limit the number of
large permanent monuments displayed on its premises, so as to preserve that park for
its other uses, such as space for play and sports and aesthetically-pleasing open areas.
But this focus on numbers provides an unsatisfying account—even when analyz-
ing speech claims in the traditional public forums of public parks and streets.  In that
228 NYC Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
229 See id. at 12.
230 See, e.g., Rapid City Public Library Meeting Room Use Policy, http://www.rapidcity
library.org/webevent/meeting_room_calendar.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
231 See generally Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (public meetings rooms are limited public forums requiring viewpoint-neutral admin-
istration and reasonable content and speaker limitations); The Seattle Public Library Meeting
Rooms Use Policy, http://www.spl.org/default.asp?pageID=about_policies_meetingrooms (last
visited Oct. 27, 2010). Based on over a decade of advising and writing laws and policies for the
City of Chicago and other municipalities, I can confirm that first-in-time policies and lotteries
are two neutral means which local governments use as methods of settling competing demands.
232 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138.
233 Id. at 1137 (emphasis added) (“Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come
to the end of their remarks; persons distributing literature and carrying signs at some point tire
and go home; monuments, however, endure. They monopolize the use of the land on which
they stand and interfere permanently with other uses of public space.”).
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context, too, there are numerous conflicts over prime locations or desirable dates,
as reflected in the Court’s own precedent upholding government permit systems for
public assemblies.234  Consider the rejected organization which cannot use the public
way to lead the parade on St. Patrick’s Day in their city’s Irish neighborhood because
of a competing organization’s prior claim; or reflect on the anti-war protestors, on the
eve of war, who are denied access to the highly-visible town square based on a long-
scheduled cultural event.235  From the speakers’ perspective, there does not seem to be
much difference between the expressive harms caused by waiting to try another year
or by being relegated to a less desirable alternative location,236 versus having one’s
monument proposal denied because that particular park lacks space for additional
structures.  It is possible—if not desirable—to apply forum analysis to offers of per-
manent monuments, and use content-neutral selection criteria and time/place/manner
rules.  Just like with park event permit systems, monument applications could be
handled by government proposing an alternate site, or a smaller or temporary display,
or by a contingent denial based on whether more park space later became available.
The real issue in the donated monument context, the essential reason that the
Court rejected forum analysis and embraced core government speech, is that the Court
agreed with the government’s stated need to make viewpoint distinctions in this ex-
pressive context.  Most compellingly, it reasoned, if viewpoint neutrality was imposed
upon monument selection, then the many governments which display donated war
memorials could be forced to display memorials “questioning the cause for which the
veterans fought.”237  And, based on the common understanding of the function of
monuments, the message conveyed by that permanent physical structure would be
attributed to the government which installed it.238  In stark contrast, viewers assume
that protestors marching, giving speeches, or distributing leaflets in a park speak for
234 See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (upholding content-neutral permit
policy to reserve park space for events); see also MacDonald v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 F.3d
355 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Thomas to uphold City of Chicago parade ordinance as a
valid time/place/manner regulation, and acknowledging need to plan distribution of limited
public resources).
235 See, e.g., CHI., ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-8-330 (1990) “Parade, public assembly or
athletic event” (establishing general first-in-time rule, and a neutral system for resolving dis-
putes over leadership of parade organizations). It is not uncommon in large cities for more than
one group to assert leadership of an established annual parade, or for the city’s central square
to be reserved in advance for cultural and entertainment events.
236 Cf. Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587 (2007) (discussing how the location that govern-
ment makes available for First Amendment activities can greatly impact the effectiveness of
private expression).
237 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138 (also relying on Pleasant Grove’s example that it would be
ludicrous to require display of a “Statue of Autocracy” based on display of the donated Statue
of Liberty).
238 SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES
127 (1998).
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themselves; the more educated viewer might also understand that the government is
required to allow such speech under the First Amendment.239
The Court never expressly analyzed whether the “limited” (as opposed to tradi-
tional or designated) public forum should apply.240  Summum may come to be viewed
as the case which finally erased the faint, yet lingering line between “content” and
“viewpoint” discrimination.241  When Justice Alito rejected Summum’s request that
these governmental decisions be handled through content-neutral time, place and
manner restrictions, he did so by responding that it is unworkable to require govern-
ments to “maintain viewpoint neutrality in their selection of monuments.”242
Interestingly, the Summum decision suggested use of objective selection criteria—
like those required for limited public forums.  In listing various reasons for finding
government speech, Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court mentioned approvingly that
Pleasant Grove City had “expressly set forth criteria [for] future selections.”243  Simi-
larly, Justice Breyer’s concurrence stated that his preferred approach would allow cities
to choose monuments “according to criteria reasonably related to one or more of [a
public park’s] legitimate ends,” which include “recreational, historical, educational,
239 See id. at 126–27 for a similar observation regarding the public’s conclusions on seeing
airport solicitors. Consequently, I am more optimistic than Dean Chemerinsky regarding future
application of Summum in public forums, and conclude that it could not fairly be applied to
traditional private uses of parks as public forums, i.e., assembly, speech, and literature dis-
tribution. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12
GREEN BAG 413, 424–27 (2009) (asserting that after Summum, there is nothing to stop gov-
ernment from converting private pro-war speech to its own, and then barring anti-war speakers
from public parks). Note that these observations apply only in established contexts, where there
are some settled public expectations. See infra Part V.B for discussion of social meaning.
240 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
241 The Court’s increasing disenchantment with the categories of forum analysis was on
display in this case. See, e.g., Justice Kennedy’s comment at oral argument: “This case is an
example of the . . . tyranny of the labels.” Summum Transcript, supra note 13, at 35. Federal
courts still sometimes draw clear distinctions. See, e.g., Choose Life v. White, 547 F.3d 853
(7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009) (specialty license plates a nonpublic forum
so content limitations, but not viewpoint discrimination, allowed).
242 Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1137–38 (emphasis added). Similarly, in support of the conclusion
that public parks should not be considered “traditional public forums for the purpose of
erecting privately donated monuments,” he cited cases from three different forum categories
(designated public forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum), with no reference to
the labels noted here, or to their historically distinctive features. Id. at 1137 (citing Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (school mail system a “nonpublic
forum”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (university
student activities fund a “limited public forum”); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)
(university facilities made generally available for student activities deemed a “designated
public forum”)).
243 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. While noting criteria with approval, Justice Alito did not
address Summum’s challenges regarding the post hoc nature, or the alleged discriminatory
application, of these criteria. Id.
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aesthetic, and other civic interests.”244  Unless coupled with the government speech
doctrine, however, such criteria are too flimsy to limit monuments to the viewpoint-
based war memorials and commemorative statues which the decision seemed to
approve for Pleasant Grove City and its government amici.  For example, a content
limitation requiring donated monuments to reflect “local history” provides no basis for
rejecting a proffered monument depicting town founders as racist, murdering thieves.
Establishing selection criteria, however, is valuable for two reasons.  Published
rules enhance political accountability;245 they also provide some protection against
government viewpoint distinctions based on impermissible reasons of racism, animus
or retaliation.246  In earlier articles, I advocated adherence to such criteria as a limit on
government speech.247  While this limit is difficult to apply to monuments, which are
acquired sporadically over the decades, Summum may encourage governments to begin
a new practice of written monument selection policies.  Additionally, written policies
are valuable to cabin governments’ otherwise unbridled discretion, and to bring this
unsettling new doctrine more into line with other constitutional protections.
In Pleasant Grove City’s situation, approving its selection criteria may also serve
a secondary purpose: providing it further protection from the anticipated post-decision
Establishment Clause challenge.  As mentioned in Part I, Summum and its proposed
monument have no local connection to Pleasant Grove City; also, there is a specific
case to be made connecting the stone Ten Commandments to Utah’s own exodus
story.248  Thus, regardless of whether Van Orden is weakened, in the particular
context of Pioneer Park, this City’s selection criteria likely will provide a defense
against the charge that its rejection of the Seven Aphorisms was based on sectarian
religious discrimination.
The opinion’s final rationale for rejecting forum analysis for monument decisions
is that the result would be “‘less speech, not more.’”249  Justice Alito reasoned that “if
public parks were considered to be traditional public forums for the purpose of erect-
ing privately donated monuments,” most parks would refuse all donations and shut
down such forums.250  He concluded: “where the application of forum analysis would
lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out
of place.”251  While this sweeping statement may stir fears of a now virtually limitless
244 Id. at 1141 (Breyer, J., concurring).
245 See, e.g., id. at 1133 (majority opinion).
246 See id. at 1132.
247 See Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 25 (showing difficulty of requiring selection criteria
for monuments because they frequently are acquired sporadically, over periods of years); Dolan
2004, supra note 7, at 114–16 (recommending tying constitutionality of government speech
selection decisions to consistency with stated program standards).
248 See supra note 124.
249 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 681 (1998)).
250 Id. at 1138.
251 Id. Note that one reason this Article concludes that Summum is based on Johanns, rather
than the “speech selection” cases, is that the opinion’s references to the latter are fleeting and
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government speech doctrine, Summum rests not on this negative case against forum
analysis, but on its affirmative case for government speech, which requires a context
imbued with expressive intent.
C. Summum’s Complex Establishment Clause Implications
Two of the concurrences, and portions of Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court,
begin to address how Summum will affect the most commonly acknowledged limit on
government speech, the Establishment Clause.252  This Part describes these conflicting
views, and then shows how the Summum opinion recognized the social meaning of
monuments, which heightens the impact of governmental religiously-themed displays.
1. The Conflicting Concurrences
Only Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, preemptively proclaimed that
Summum’s holding creates no Establishment Clause risk for Pleasant Grove.253  Justice
Scalia declared forcefully that nothing in Van Orden suggested it was based on a
finding that the monument was the Eagles’ private speech; thus, in his view, nothing
has changed.254
Justice Souter was the only other Justice to examine the decision’s Establishment
Clause implications directly;255 his opinion sought to begin working out the interaction
of the two principles.256  Concurring only in the judgment, he advocated applying the
located in the section focused on the logistics of rejecting forum analysis. See id. at 1137
(quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (for general point that
forum principles “‘are out of place in [this] context’”)); id. (quoting Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681)
(for point that allowing all speakers would be logistically burdensome); see also id. at 1131
(quoting Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring))
(noting, during the earlier “government speech” portion of the Summum opinion, that Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Finley expressed his individual opinion that government can limit NEA
funding to only those private artists whose art expresses government viewpoints).
252 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132; id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see id. at
1142 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (making more complex statements regarding
the interaction).
253 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
254 Id. See Dorf, supra note 14 (on impact of Summum, concluded that only two Justices
(Scalia and Thomas) “argue[d] that if the Establishment Clause issue were squarely before the
Court it would change nothing,” while four Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens)
argued that “it would potentially change the analysis”).
255 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, noted the Establishment Clause limitation
on government speech, and asserted that the case could have been decided based on the
government’s “implicit endorsement of the donor’s message.” Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139
(Stevens, J., concurring); Justice Breyer was silent on the Establishment Clause issue. See
id. at 1140–41 (Breyer, J. concurring).
256 Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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same “reasonable observer” endorsement test for both issues;257 using that standard,
he agreed that the Pioneer Park monuments were government speech.258  This pro-
posal was his proffered solution to a “numbers problem” different from that focused
on by Justice Alito.259  When a monument has some religious aspect, he wrote, a
government frequently tries to avoid violating the Establishment Clause by adding
additional, secular displays; but the more numerous and diverse the exhibits, the
harder it becomes to conclude that the government is speaking its own viewpoint with
any particular monument.260
Going straight to the heart of the issue, Justice Souter wrote that Pleasant Grove’s
“Ten Commandments monument is government speech, that is, an expression of a
government’s position on the moral and religious issues raised by the subject of the
monument.”261  As he somewhat gleefully reminded the others at oral argument, he
was a dissenter in Van Orden;262 thus, one passage in his concurrence is puzzling. 
Anticipating future arguments that the government speech doctrine frees governments
of the Establishment Clause prohibition on discriminating among religions, he stated:
“Whether that view turns out to be sound is more than I can say at this point.”263 
257 Id. at 1142. Specifically, he proposed “to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed
observer would understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private
speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public
land.” Id.
In a post-Summum specialty license plate case, the Eighth Circuit did just that. See Roach
v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009) (After reviewing the Summum decision, the Eighth
Circuit stated: “Informed by the Supreme Court,” its own prior precedent, and the other
Circuits’ decisions on specialty plates, “[o]ur analysis boils down to one key question: whether,
under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the
speaker to be the government or a private party,” and holding that the plates are the vehicle
owners’ speech); see also Choose Life v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009) (specialty license plate case where court reduced the four-factor
test to: “Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be
the government or a private party?”); Gaylord, supra note 213, at 61 (concluding that the
Summum decision precluded further application of the endorsement test).
258 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I find the monuments here
to be government expression”; more precisely, his opinion focused solely on the Ten
Commandments).
259 Id. at 1141–42.
260 Id. “[I]t will be in the interest of a careful government to accept other monuments to
stand nearby, to dilute the appearance of adopting whatever particular religious position the
single example alone might stand for. As mementoes and testimonials pile up, however, the
chatter may well make it less intuitively obvious that the government is speaking in its own
right simply by maintaining the monuments.” Id. at 1141.
261 Id. at 1141 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (an early
Supreme Court decision discussing the theory and meaning of core government speech)).
262 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 736–45 (2005) (Souter, J. dissenting); Summum
Transcript, supra note 13, at 63.
263 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Given Justice Souter’s longstanding adherence to neutrality in his Establishment
Clause opinions, this reference seems to reflect a weary resignation to a possible future
victory for Justice Scalia’s “monotheist nation” argument.264  Or, it may be an indirect
reference to the expanding litigation over legislative chaplains, where the more cultur-
ally liberal approach has become to characterize such prayers as “government speech”
in order to require that they be inclusive and nonsectarian.265  Given his departure from
the Court, the puzzle over his meaning may linger.
2. A New Perspective on Justice Alito’s Many-Layered Points on the Content of
Monuments’ Messages
Turning back to the Summum majority opinion, its only explicit reference to this
topic was to acknowledge, in passing, that “government speech must comport with
the Establishment Clause.”266  As mentioned above, however, Justice Alito’s exten-
sive discussion on the content of messages conveyed by monuments appears directed
toward the underlying religious speech controversy.  He wrote, “Even when a monu-
ment features the written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and
may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”267  While quot-
ing the entire lyrics of John Lennon’s song “Imagine” drew comment,268 far more
But the government could well argue, as a development of the govern-
ment speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own views, it is free of
the Establishment Clause’s stricture against discriminating among reli-
gious sects or groups. Under this view of the relationship between the
two doctrines, it would be easy for a government to favor some private
religious speakers over others by its choice of monuments to accept.
Id. One interpretation that seems to me quite unfounded, given Justice Souter’s long-term
consistent position that the Establishment Clause requires government neutrality between
religion and irreligion, as well as among sects, is that Justice Souter was advocating this radical
change. But see Gaylord, supra note 213, at 71 (“Under Justice Souter’s proposal, the govern-
ment would have broad discretion not only to choose which message to convey but also to
promote religion or one sect over another.”).
264 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893–99 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See also Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2006).
265 See, e.g., Turner v. City of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354–55 (4th Cir. 2008)
(finding legislative prayer “government speech” under four-factor test and denying Free Speech
claim by speaker rejected for sectarian Christian prayer); see also supra notes 139–41 and
accompanying text.
266 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
267 Id. at 1135.
268 See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Justice Alito “Imagines” John Lennon, LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 25,
2009), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/02/justice-alito-imagines-john
-lennon.html (noting reference to “Imagine” monument in Central Park and opinion’s footnote
with full text of Lennon’s lyrics to the song); Orin Kerr, Pleasant Grove v. Summum, THE
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striking was his statement that even a very simple monument—a statue displaying the
word “peace” in many languages—is “almost certain to evoke different thoughts and
sentiments in the minds of different observers.”269  Recently Professor Steven Gey
used this puzzling passage to argue for elimination of the government speech doctrine,
categorizing Summum as: “Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing
(Legal) to Say.”270
This line of analysis—which was completely extraneous to deciding Summum—
already has been used to argue the futility of the Establishment Clause endorsement
test.271  It does seem likely that Justice Alito was carefully laying the groundwork to
preserve Van Orden’s focus on the secular messages conveyed by religious symbols.272 
But the broader interpretation, that this Summum riff means the endorsement test is
obsolete, is contradicted by numerous statements in his Summum opinion.
First, such statements—which suggest that it is impossible to determine the expres-
sive content of monuments—are internally inconsistent with the opinion’s reasons for
finding that the monuments are government speech.  Recall how the Court’s affir-
mative case focused on the government’s expressive intent and viewers’ reasonable
attribution.  Selecting a monument to convey an idea and present a desirable image
to the public is quite distinguishable from displaying a monument for no particular
purpose.273  Even more clearly, the decision borrowed liberally from the contextual
analysis used in Establishment Clause cases: the Court placed great emphasis on its
conclusion that observers, viewing donated monuments in public parks, would
“reasonably [i]nterpret them as conveying some message” from the government.274
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 25, 2009, 5:43 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/02/25/pleasant-grove
-city-v-summum/ (generally praising Justice Alito’s “well-reasoned” majority opinion, but
criticizing the footnote with complete lyrics as unnecessary and “a bit too cute”).
269 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135 (citing IMLA Brief 6–7).
270 Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When
the Government has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1301–02 (2010) (Summum
created a “new concept of government speech in which the government apparently never in-
tended to say anything,” but used the doctrine to surreptitiously convey a religious message).
271 See Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 28–34, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (No. 08-472) (arguing that the
endorsement test cannot survive Summum because the Court “squarely rejected [its] single-
message assumption”).
272 See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
273 Compare Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (when a government installs a monument, “it
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who see
the structure”) and id. at 1134 (emphasis added) (“The City has selected those monuments
that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it wishes to
project to all who frequent the Park . . . .”) with id. at 1135 (“[T]he monument may be intended
to be interpreted . . . in a variety of ways.”).
274 Id. at 1133. While one could argue that ascertaining the identity of the speaker is a
simpler task than agreeing on a monument’s primary message, it may not be, given the exten-
sive lower court litigation on whether the speaker at issue should be deemed the government
or a private person.
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Second, even within the section discussing the content of monuments’ expressions,
several of Justice Alito’s statements acknowledged the familiar experience where a
monument does send a commonly-understood message.275  Most clearly, the Court
noted that the Statue of Liberty is now universally viewed as a welcoming beacon to
immigrants.276  In addition, the Court’s explanation that the meaning of a monument
can change over time with the culture, and can be modified by the later addition of
other monuments close by, implicitly recognized that monuments send communal
messages.277  They do not typically function as abstract images for individualized con-
templation, like post-modern art or Rorschach tests.  Moreover, these points in the
opinion echo, and thus reinforce, the Establishment Clause endorsement test.
Finally, the clearest conclusion from this part of the opinion was that the govern-
ment’s intended message may differ from the donor’s and the creator’s.278  The Court
used the public museum example: in that context, viewers would not perceive the
State as intending to convey a religious message by displaying a painting of a religious
scene among the collection.279  This point, of course, could work in both directions:
it is certainly possible that the Eagles could intend to deter juvenile delinquency by
promoting a moral code, while government officials could intend to communicate the
biblical identity of their community.
V. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS ON PASSIVE
GOVERNMENT IDENTITY SPEECH
This Part integrates the arguments for why Summum should impact the Court’s
Establishment Clause approach, particularly regarding government’s display of
275 Buono, 130 at 1821–23 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
276 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 (The Statue of Liberty came “to be viewed as a beacon
welcoming immigrants to a land of freedom.”).
277 Id. (referring to Vietnam Veterans Memorial, where addition of flagstaff and Three
Soldiers statue sufficiently changed overall effect of original design to achieve agreement on
display). For other examples of this principle, see Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 26–27 (“The
expressive symbolic power of monuments also is highlighted when the public’s perception
of a given monument changes along with cultural mores,” (e.g., IMLA example of a now
politically incorrect statue of Native Americans), or when a newly-installed monument trans-
forms the prior identity message (e.g., a statue of African-American tennis great Arthur Ashe
altered the cultural message of Richmond’s “Monument Avenue,” which was previously
comprised solely of Confederate generals)). See also IMLA Brief, supra note 3, at 13.
278 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 (stating that “the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a
government entity that accepts and displays [a monument] may be quite different from those
of either its creator or its donor”).
279 Id. at 1136 n.5. This point was relied on recently to disassociate a county from a donor’s
religious motivation for posting the Ten Commandments. See ACLU v. Grayson County, 591
F.3d 837, 851 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136) (upholding Ten
Commandments display in county courthouse, despite donor’s apparent religious purpose);
see infra note 366 for further discussion of Grayson.
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recognizable religious symbols.  It also explains my modest proposal for the minimum,
compromising next steps on this hotly-contested political and legal issue: (1) requiring
a clear disclaimer explaining government’s intended secular message, and (2) imposing
strict neutrality requirements on any future public monuments with religious themes. 
This practical approach is an effort to break the impasse, to find compromise between
contrasting worldviews, rather than to create an ideal scheme.280
After recapping the doctrinal reasons for Summum’s impact, Part V discusses the
“social meaning” of governmental Ten Commandments displays, how it has changed
over time, and the essential point that Justice Alito’s opinion recognized the shifting
social understandings of monuments.  Then, it explains why the endorsement test
may have staying power, and analyzes two recent scholarly articles which recommend
more stringent standards.  Finally, this Part provides a more detailed account of my
suggested compromise proposal, which retains practical value even if the endorsement
test fails to survive.
A. Recapping the Doctrinal Background Shows Why Summum Matters
Part II took some time to lay the groundwork for my argument that the Court’s
opinion puts donated monuments into the “core” government speech category—
what Justice Stevens referred to as its “recently minted” doctrine, exemplified by
Johanns.281  This is meaningful for Establishment Clause purposes because the Court
did not emphasize the government’s institutional role as curator, selecting which pri-
vate donors’ expressions should be displayed in its park monuments.282  Instead, when
analyzing government’s role in accepting private monuments, the Court took the posi-
tion that government is making decisions that express the community’s identity and
convey “government-controlled” messages—even where those “messages” are broad
and thematic, rather than precise and clearly articulated.283
280 My effort to find compromise on this specific issue is inspired by other recent works
which are expressly directed towards resolving (more comprehensively) the conflict between
accommodationists and separationists. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 9 (explicitly
seeking a “third way that could produce reconciliation between . . . the extremes of both values
evangelicals and legal secularists. In place of their mutually exclusive visions,” he proposed
permitting government to continue symbolic religious speech, while rigorously prohibiting
government aid to/partnership with religious institutions); Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government
Speech Endorsing a Higher Law Resolve the Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J.
41, 103 (2009) (“The goal at the end of the day is to find common ground where possible. . . .
Recognizing that traditional religious language . . . can be understood as promoting very broad
claims about reality might allow a new kind of consensus to emerge.”).
281 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139.
282 See supra Part II (defining Rust and Johanns as “core” government speech because they
are based on specific policy messages, in contrast to both “speech selection” cases, e.g., Finley,
and Garcetti, which were based instead on facilitating government’s valuable institutional roles).
283 See supra Part IV.A. The Court relied on points that the City “selected those monuments
it wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project
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Part III provided the backdrop for explaining why this type of core “government
speech” defense to Free Speech Clause claims is a more potent determination than a
finding, in Establishment Clause litigation, that the government is speaking or endors-
ing private speech.284  Specifically concerning donated religious displays, Part III
showed that Van Orden’s outcome was based in part on the distancing role of the
donor; Justice Breyer found that the Eagles’ plaque made it more likely that the monu-
ment conveyed their civic message.  Summum has now dissolved that helpful construct.
More broadly, Summum’s novel, affirmative declarations of government identity
speech make a stronger statement than does a judicial determination—in an Establish-
ment Clause case—that government officials, rather than private speaker participants,
bear more responsibility for challenged religious content.285  Also, integral to the
“government speech doctrine” espoused in Summum is that the government is allowed
to reject offers to display competing religious icons, and to do so solely on the grounds
that such messages do not comport with the city’s preferred values and image.
Making this explicit sends a clearer message of governmental favoritism.  This
degree of candor is itself damaging to the constitutional ideal of neutrality, as shown
by Justice Scalia’s McCreary County dissent, in which he argued that the Establishment
Clause allows governmental Ten Commandments displays because 97% of Americans
believe its religious truth.286  While, given the contextual factors discussed above, many
might see the Van Orden plurality as similarly motivated, explaining the decision in
terms of the Ten Commandments’ history as an early legal code at least sends a less
troublesome message.
B. Endorsement and the “Social Meaning” of Summum
While the endorsement test has been attacked regularly, and understandably, as
subjective and indeterminate,287 at the same time, other scholars have sought to clarify
to all who frequent the Park,” and the City “unmistakenly signif[ied] to all Park visitors that
the City intends the monument to speak on its behalf” by putting it in a park “that is linked
to the City’s identity.” See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
284 See supra Part III.A.
285 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
286 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Laura Underkuffler, Through Glass Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers of
Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 59 (2010).
287 See, e.g., Jessie H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L.
& POL. 499 (2002) (criticizing the endorsement test as incapable of principled application and
inconsistent with government accommodation of religion). Indeed, this flaw was acknowledged
even in the law review article that is frequently cited as a primary defense of this approach. See
William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”:The Supreme Court and Establishment,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533–34 (1986) (acknowledging the “essential weakness” of the
symbolic approach, that it is “potentially highly individualistic and subject to extraordinary
manipulation,” and has a “critical dependence on who is interpreting the ‘symbol’”).
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and expand its use.  The expressivist approach to constitutional law has provided a
new theoretical basis; it supports judging Establishment Clause compliance by the
social meaning of the State’s involvement with religious messages and institutions.288 
And the recent comprehensive work on the religion clauses by Provost Christopher
Eisgruber and Dean Lawrence Sager, their “Equal Liberty” theory, similarly embraces
the endorsement test and its focus on social meaning.289  Echoing Justice O’Connor’s
rationale, “Equal Liberty insists that no member of the community ought to be devalued
on account of the spiritual foundations of his or her basic commitments.”290
Eisgruber and Sager provide an accessible working definition of “social meaning”
as “the meaning that a competent participant in the society in question would see in
that event or expression.”291  As noted, parts of the Summum majority opinion seemed
to question that possibility, by focusing on the multiple possible meanings of a given
symbol.292  Professor Lawrence Lessig’s work on social meaning provides a convinc-
ing response.  As he wrote, to say “that more than one construction may be possible . . .
does not imply that every construction is possible. . . .  What is ‘possible’ hangs upon
particular histories and material conditions, and the constraints of both are real.”293
288 See David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment
Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 563–65 (2002) (proposing using “an expressivist approach
to the Establishment Clause, built upon Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s endorsement test, as
a mediating principle” between “separationists” and “assimilationists,” and arguing for extend-
ing use of that test to the arena of “charitable choice” social work funding decisions). For a
comprehensive account of the expressivist theory, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
For a prominent scholar’s critique of expressivist theories and the endorsement test, see
Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV.
506 (2001) (arguing that expressivism is best understood as an attempt to reconcile juris-
prudence with the general cultural discomfort with the lack of foundational justifications for
law in a secular age, but concluding that the expressivists are ultimately unsuccessful, precisely
because society lacks this shared metaphysical grounding). My own response to Professor
Smith’s detailed critique is that the degree of logical consistency required among philosophers
to justify a particular position differs markedly from the everyday rationales accepted daily by
citizens, judges, and lawmakers as reasonable justifications for their actions. Moreover, while
his account of the pre-modern world as sharing common ideas about ultimate, supernatural
meaning is persuasive, less so is his apparent assumption that this pre-modern shared belief
in ultimate meaning translated into uniform agreement on particular hard questions.
289 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 184, at 125–46.
290 Id. at 18.
291 Id. at 127.
292 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135–36 (2009).
293 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 949–50
n.19 (1995) (citing and responding to Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and Symbolic Power,
7 SOC. THEORY 14, 19 (1989)). Lessig defines “social meanings” as “the semiotic content
attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.” Id. at 951.
He defines “context” as a “collection of understandings or expectations shared by some groups
at a particular time and place.” Id. at 958. The more uncontested, the more powerful the social
meaning, and “the more contested . . . , the less powerful.” Id. at 960–61.
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Two of Professor Lessig’s examples show how shifting cultural interpretations,
and the Summum opinion, have changed the social meaning of government’s religious
displays.  First, for many decades, the Confederate flag was a fading symbol of regional
pride and the lost Civil War, but “early in the 1950s, it was revived as a political sym-
bol by those most firmly resisting civil rights legislation in the South.”294  In this new
context, when predominately white legislatures voted to raise the Confederate flag, the
social meaning to black Southerners was a message of racial inequality and resistance
to proposed political change.295
Second, much of Lessig’s work examined “cases where contexts are changed,
not where they simply change.”296  Looking at how countries construct their national
identities, he focused on the example of Ecuador.  Evolving from its earlier history,
where “a relatively unified national self was constructed in opposition to an inferior
indigenous other,”297 since the 1980s Ecuador has reintegrated the “Indian” into its
national identity, using techniques such as national holidays and state-sponsored
festivals.298  Under the new First Amendment doctrine espoused by Summum, these
techniques—like public monuments—now would be labeled “government speech.”
While analyzing active efforts to modify cultural context, Lessig identified two
semiotic techniques that serve to alter or preserve social meanings.299  “Tying,” a
staple of the advertising world, can transform a symbol’s social meaning by associ-
ating it with the social meaning that the actor intends the symbol to have.300  And
“ambiguation” gives a particular symbol a second meaning, without denying its exist-
ing meaning, “and thereby blurs just what it is that X is.”301
The social meaning of governmental religious monuments, especially the Ten
Commandments, has changed based on both types of phenomena identified by Lessig:
significant shifts in sociological/cultural context, and intentional actions by legislatures
and now the Court.  The significant increase in religious pluralism since the Eagles’
distribution project in the 1960s and early 1970s has changed the message conveyed
294 Id. at 953.
295 Id. at 953–64 (citing James Forman, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate
Flag from Southern State Capitals, 101 YALE L.J. 505 (1991)); see also Dolan 2008, supra
note 7, at 52 & n.245 (relying on Forman to argue for a prohibition on such racist govern-
ment speech).
296 Lessig, supra note 293, at 962.
297 Id. at 981 (quoting Mary Crain, The Social Construction of National Identity in Highland
Ecuador, 63 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 43, 46 (1990)).
298 Id. at 982.
299 Id. at 1009.
300 Id. (providing the commercial example of beautiful models used by Gap to transform
the image of traditional workers’ clothing).
301 Id. at 1010–12 (giving the example of the Civil Rights Acts, and how these laws helped
white businessmen who wanted to serve or employ blacks—whether for altruistic or com-
mercial reasons—to avoid negative consequences from prejudiced customers, by ambiguating
the social meaning of what was now behavior required by law).
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by governmental actions (and inactions) in this regard.  And the Court’s decision in
Summum itself has altered the social meaning of Van Orden, based in part on the
techniques identified above.
Looking first at the Summum decision, the Court’s act of identifying all donated
monuments, including the Eagles-donated Ten Commandments, as “government
speech”302 exacerbates the Establishment Clause dilemma.  Using Lessig’s terminology,
this label more clearly “ties” the government to what formerly could be viewed as a
message communicated by the monument’s donors.  It increases the status of the Ten
Commandments from what could be viewed as unintentional endorsement of the reli-
gious text, to a government-controlled message expressing agreement with this creed. 
At the same time, the Summum opinion performs a “de-ambiguating” function here. 
By removing the donor’s communicative role, it undercuts efforts to blur legal respon-
sibility for the monument’s face value: its religious text.303
Moreover, judicial opinions themselves can construct new social meanings.304  This
may be particularly true here, where the opinion has given a new, or at least newly-
defined, descriptive label to an existing symbol.  Borrowing from Professor Jessie
Hill’s application of “speech act theory” to Establishment Clause cases, descriptive
words “may also help to construct the reality that they describe or purport to describe,”
particularly where that description is proclaimed by “the voice of sovereign authority,”
which includes the Court.305  As mentioned above,306 the equal access cases provide a
good example.  A common government meeting room use policy, which excluded reli-
gious groups based on the then-current understanding of constitutional requirements
302 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).
303 But see ACLU v. Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 851 (6th Cir. 2010) (providing an
unusual, and I think incorrect, interpretation of Summum and the Court’s precedent, the court
stated that a Ten Commandment donor’s religious motivation could be attributed to the county
defendant if there were a sign on the Foundations display linking it to the religious donor (citing
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 667, 701–02 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989))).
304 See Lessig, supra note 293, at 1014 n.241 (“And indeed, one could say, the opinion in
Barnette itself was an act that was constructing a certain social meaning—this time the social
meaning of the First Amendment. Through its proclamation, Jackson established a conception
of neutrality in America . . . .”).
305 Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi, supra note 137, at 733–35. Words that
only describe a state of affairs often nonetheless function as “performatives,” or speech acts,
a type of “utterances that can bring about an effect by the mere fact of their utterances.” Id.
at 733 (quoting J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 5 (1962)). Speech act theory
is a branch of linguistic theory.
Professor Hill also notes that a judicial opinion can engage in such descriptive speech acts;
a court’s description of a symbol’s historical and interpreted meaning “attempts to construct
the reality it describes.” Id. at 757. As shown next, writing pre-Summum, her applications of
speech act theory have led to a rejection of the endorsement test. See infra Part V.C.2.
306 See supra Introduction.
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and an effort to avoid favoritism or divisiveness, was redefined by the Court as uncon-
stitutional discrimination based on religious viewpoint.307  Doing so changed not only
legal doctrine, but cultural norms and social group expectations as well.
Looking next at the cultural background changes, there are three relevant points in
time: (1) when the Eagles’ displays were installed; (2) when Van Orden was decided;
and (3) the post-Summum period.  First, there was an extraordinary cultural shift in this
country from the time the Eagles began distributing the Ten Commandments monu-
ments around the country (1955) and carried out most of the campaign (during the
1960s),308 to the time of the Van Orden and Summum decisions.
When the Eagles embarked upon their philanthropic mission to stem juvenile delin-
quency, it was during the Cold War, and prior to many of the changes to the traditional
family structure and social mores which have stimulated much of the current cultural
conflict.309  Participation in both organized religion and fraternal civic organizations
was at a high point, and the Eagles’ efforts to create a “nonsectarian” version of the
Ten Commandments reflected society’s relatively newfound integration of Catholic
and Jewish citizens and embrace of its shared “Judeo-Christian” faith.310  Given that
context, there is a more reasonable likelihood that viewers at these dedications asso-
ciated the monuments with their local Eagles’ extensive secular charitable works,311
and their well-publicized efforts to reduce juvenile crime by promulgation of a moral
code—which may have been perceived at that time as inclusive and pluralistic.
But by 2005, the time of the Court’s Van Orden decision, the social meaning of
Texas’s display had changed.  There is a clear parallel here to scholarly observations
about the resurgence of the Confederate flag based on its new social meaning as a
symbol of resistance to racial equality.312  Similarly, commentators have noted that the
more recent push to spread the Ten Commandments to public squares and government
buildings, and to litigate to defend existing monuments, derives from conservative
religionists’ frustration over significant social changes wrought by a more liberal
307 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394–97 (1993).
308 The Eagles campaign began with the distribution of over 7,000 prints of the Ten
Commandments starting in 1951, the first monoliths were dedicated in 1955, and the last one
was dedicated in 1985. See Ten Commandments Project Impacts Lives, http://www.foe.com/
about-us/ten-commandments.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). The majority of the campaign,
which included approximately 145 monuments, occurred through the 1960s. Sue A. Hoffman,
The Real History of the Ten Commandments Project of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, http://
www.religioustolerance.org/hoffman01.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
309 See FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 165–70.
310 See id. (discussing the invention of the term “Judeo-Christian” in the 1950s, calling it
a “creative misreading of the American past with the aim of retrospectively including Jews
in the American national project,” and emphasizing shared morality (citing WILL HERBERG,
PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955))).
311 Fraternal Order of Eagles, http://www.foe.com/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
312 Chris Springer, The Troubled Resurgence of the Confederate Flag, 43 HIST. TODAY
7 (1993).
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Court, particularly the legalization of abortion and the end of school prayer.313  Begin-
ning in the 1970s and prominently by the 1980s, religious evangelicals and values con-
servatives became a powerful political force.314  Deep and intense divides on polarizing
social issues, particularly abortion and now gay marriage, sometimes are summarized
as the “Culture Wars” or “Red States versus Blue States.”315
With respect to any Establishment Clause claim brought against a government’s
Ten Commandments monument post-Summum, the social meaning has changed again. 
When Summum was decided, the larger “Culture Wars” backdrop was relatively
stable, but its case-specific context raised new religious discrimination charges not
present in Van Orden.  In addition to the semiotic issue created by the “government
speech” label, most media accounts and legal commentary painted Pleasant Grove
City’s actions as sending a message of religious discrimination, and the Court’s new
government speech holding as allowing such selectivity.316  Under these circum-
stances, even provisionally accepting that a Ten Commandments monument conveys
a secular message, a city’s acts of defending its selective display risks being perceived
as promoting the majority religion, and thus requires a clear, consistent, public ex-
planation of the government’s secular rationale.  Recently, the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized as much, when it interpreted local political leaders’ enthused defense of a new
Ten Commandments display as endorsement of the icon’s current social meaning
of religious activism.317  There, some of the commissioners’ statements were made
during a religiously-themed community rally to support the monument in the face
of an Establishment Clause lawsuit.318
In an important, overlooked aspect of Justice Alito’s majority opinion, he ex-
pressly acknowledged this phenomenon, stating: “The ‘message’ conveyed by a
313 See FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 243 (“Evangelicals’ perceived exclusion fuel[ed] resent-
ment and a reactionary attempt to impose brand-new symbols, like the Ten Commandments
in courthouses, where none existed before.”); see also GOLDBERG, supra note 25, 7–38.
314 FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 188–99.
315 See id. (describing the rise of Jerry Falwell’s “Moral Majority” political organization,
Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition, and religious conservatives’ influence on presidential
politics, and the new concerted legal strategies). See generally, JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS (1991). Note that Pat Robertson founded the ACLJ legal advocacy organi-
zation, which is led by Jay Sekulow, Counsel for Pleasant Grove City in the Summum case.
See Andrew Buttaro, A Lawyer Conservatives Can Love, TOWNHALL MAGAZINE 62 (April
2009), available at http://www.aclj.org/media/pdf/TownhallMagazine-Sekulow.pdf.
316 See supra note 9.
317 See Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Commr’s, 568 F.3d 784, 801–02 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
318 See id. (holding the new Ten Commandments monument on courthouse lawn violated
Establishment Clause based in part on commissioner statements expressing a desire to fight
to keep the Ten Commandments display for sectarian religious reasons); Dolan 2008, supra
note 7, at 50–51 (briefly making similar claim in reference to the social meaning of litigating
to keep monument).
2010] GOVERNMENT IDENTITY SPEECH AND RELIGION 57
monument may change over time” as society’s interpretation of history and culture
evolves.319  While Justice Alito did expound on the indeterminacy of monuments’
messages, he also attributed at least part of that indeterminacy to these temporal
changes in social meaning.320  Moreover, the opinion explicitly recognized the pos-
sibility, and the reality, of discerning a shared communal meaning attached to a
particular monument.  He explained how the Statue of Liberty began as a symbol
of international friendship, and later became commonly understood as “a beacon
welcoming immigrants to a land of freedom.”321  In addition, Justice Alito’s majority
opinion acknowledged that government retains some control in shaping how viewers
will understand a monument’s meaning, including by adding additional elements to
a display.322  To be sure, government’s ability to alter social meaning by adding addi-
tional elements to a display has been the basis for much endorsement test analysis
in Establishment Clause challenges to displays.323
Applying this reasoning from the Summum majority opinion supports the idea
that, given the cultural changes and the new judicial paradigm, a monument that once
was viewed as a benevolent reminder of a shared moral code, now would be under-
stood more commonly as a symbol of the “Culture Wars” and of attempts by the
majority religion to hold on to control of religious messages in the public square.
319 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009) (noting that “[a] study
of war memorials found that ‘people reinterpret’ the meaning of these memorials as ‘historical
interpretations’ and ‘the society around them changes.’” (quoting JAMES M. MAYO, WAR
MEMORIALS AS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, 8–9 (1988))); see also Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at
26–27, 50–51 (published prior to opinion) (citing MAYO, supra, and examples from the IMLA
Municipal Practice Examples, to show that monuments’ meanings change over time with
cultural mores, and then arguing from there that these kinds of cultural changes can run up
against Establishment Clause limits on a government’s formerly noncontroversial religiously-
themed monuments).
320 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136.
321 Id.; see also B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 519 & n.159 (2005) [hereinafter
Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context] (while generally asserting the difficulty of
ascertaining social meaning, she posed a hypothetical of a tiny cult starting to worship an
abstract sculpture in a town square; while initially not likely to be deemed “religious” within
the Establishment Clause, over a period of years, “eventually a critical mass of people would
agree that the symbol qualifies as religious”).
322 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1136 (noting that a government may change the message
conveyed by a given monument “by the subsequent addition of other monuments in the same
vicinity,” and explaining that when the government purposefully added a flag and soldier statue
to the Vietnam War Memorial, “many believed [the addition] changed [the Memorial’s] overall
effect”); see also Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 27 (explaining how the City of Richmond,
Virginia located a new statue of Arthur Ashe in line with existing statues of Confederate
Generals to alter the overall message).
323 See supra Part III.
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C. The Endorsement Test Remains the Best Realistic Option
1. Justice Alito & the Endorsement Test’s Potential Staying Power
My proposal is grounded in—and yet independent of—retaining the endorsement
test, despite its often-recognized flaws, both because it asks the right questions324 and
because it is the best realistic option, given the current Court’s views.  As noted above,
some prominent law and religion scholars predict that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement
test is unlikely to survive in the Roberts Court.325  The larger concern, that the Court
will adopt a new nonpreferentialist approach and allow government favoritism of reli-
gion over non-religion (and perhaps even monotheism over other faith traditions), is
based on the belief that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will create a new 5-4
majority for that position.326
There is reason to believe, however, that Justice Alito will not completely reject the
endorsement test.  Most significantly, as detailed above, endorsement-style analysis
permeates his opinion for the Court in Summum.327  Moreover, not only did he use it
as a third circuit judge,328 but Justice Alito also relied on endorsement-type analysis
to determine the content of a speaker’s message in Morse v. Frederick, the “Bong
Hits 4 Jesus” student free speech case.  There, he concurred on the assumption that the
decision “goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use.”329
324 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
325 See, e.g., Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, supra note 26, at 48. See generally
GREENAWALT, supra note 26 (questioning survival of endorsement test after Justice O’Connor).
326 See, e.g., Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, supra note 26, at 1 (predicting that
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts will complete the transformation of the Establishment
Clause to an “integrationist” regime, even incorporating Justice Scalia’s monotheistic nation
view); Terry, supra note 26, at 70–71 (predicting Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will
join Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy to create a 5-4 majority, overturn decades of
Establishment Clause precedent, and institute nonpreferentialism).
327 See generally Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125.
328 E.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d
514, 531 (3d Cir. 2004) (where the Bible camp “Good News Club” met in after-school meeting
space pursuant to an equal access policy, held that distribution of its fliers would not violate the
endorsement test because a reasonable observer would know of the school district’s policy
to distribute a broad range of community group fliers); ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 106
(3d Cir. 1999) (upholding a Jersey City holiday display as similar to those upheld in Lynch
and Allegheny, then-Judge Alito also advocated consideration of “the general scope of Jersey
City’s practice regarding diverse cultural displays and celebrations” in evaluating the message
conveyed to a reasonable observer by a display).
329 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). In addition, a
number of Justice Alito’s statements in his Salazar v. Buono concurrence illustrate contextual
analysis that resonates with the endorsement test. See Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono:
The Cross Between Endorsement and History, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42,
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While his opinions regarding religious speech are assimilationist and easily
characterized as conservative,330 Justice Alito’s primary concern appears to be with
preserving individual rights to private religious speech as a valid mode of discourse
within governmental spheres, particularly in public schools.331  This emphasis, which
differs from Justice Scalia’s spirited defense of government endorsement of majority
religion, suggests Justice Alito’s concern for minorities’ liberty of conscience, even if
his opinions sometimes may show ambivalence regarding feelings of exclusion when
majority religious expression is sponsored by the government.332
No one would assert at this juncture that the endorsement test is a panacea.  Com-
mentators are correct that it can be, and has been, used to defend majoritarian religious
displays and to diminish legitimate minority concerns.333  At the same time, the test
retains some value, and not only in contradistinction to the threatened alternatives. 
When courts start their Establishment Clause analysis by asking whether a reasonable
observer would conclude that the government is promoting or endorsing religion, the
question itself has valuable social meaning.  The act of asking this question reaffirms
the Court’s adherence to an even-handed neutrality, which supports liberty of con-
science.334  Optimally, identified problems of majority bias and indeterminacy would
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/21/LRColl2010n21Dolan.pdf
[hereinafter Dolan 2010].
330 This is most clear from Justice Alito’s opinions on standing. See Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found. Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (no taxpayer standing to sue White House faith-
based office over its funding religious organizations for conferences unless Congress specifi-
cally authorized the challenged programs); see also ACLU v. Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258 (3d
Cir. 2001) (plantiffs/residents lacked taxpayer standing to challenge township religious holiday
display because they failed to show the township had spent any money, employee time spent
was de minimus, and insufficient allegations of personal contact with modified display).
331 C.H. v. Olivia, 226 F.3d 198, 210–12 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting). Where a
school removed as inappropriate a first grader’s drawing of Jesus made in response to an
assignment to draw something for which each child was thankful, Judge Alito would have
found a First Amendment violation: “I would hold that public school students have the right
to express religious views in class discussion or in assigned work, provided that their ex-
pression falls within the scope of the discussion or the assignment,” except that he would
permit school authorities to intervene “if the expression of a particular religious viewpoint,
such as one espousing racial hatred, creates a sufficient threat.” Id. at 210, 212.
332 One troubling sign in lower court cases is the contrast between Justice Alito’s very
formalistic approach to dismissing the holiday display case in Wall, as compared with his
dissent in the Olivia school poster case, which the third circuit had dismissed for similarly
technical procedural reasons. Put in the most favorable light, it shows that he prioritizes
protecting individual speech over protecting minorities from offense caused by religious
speech in the public square.
333 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious Minorities: On the
Evolution of the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. STATE L. REV. 667 (2008); see also infra
Part V.C.2.
334 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 184 (embracing endorsement approach). But see
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51 (2007). Professor
Laycock’s famous theory of “substantive neutrality” provides a unified theory of the religion
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be corrected, and the endorsement test realigned with its minority-protective rationale
by, for example, adopting proposals to use the reasonable non-adherent’s perspective.335
Even at present, though, the endorsement test offers some minimal level of concern
for religious minorities.  Next, an analysis of two recent scholarly articles which offer
potentially more appealing solutions underscores my proposal’s practical value.
2. Professor Hill’s Rebuttable Presumption & Removing Most Religious Displays
Professor Jessie Hill uses linguistic theory to critique and reject the endorsement
test as irremediably indeterminate and majoritarian.336  She argues that consensus on
the meaning of religious symbols is impossible because of “[t]he diversity of religious
beliefs and of attitudes toward the role of religion in society.”337  Professor Hill further
asserts that any agreement which does exist necessarily will reflect and reinforce
majority religious beliefs.338
To remedy these very real and sympathetic concerns, Hill proposes an elegant, yet
ultimately unmarketable, doctrinal change: adding “a presumption against religious
symbols on government property to the current endorsement test.”339  While a govern-
ment could rebut the presumption by showing “that the message conveyed by a given
display is unequivocally secular and nonendorsing,” as described by Hill, this would
occur very rarely and “the vast majority” of religious displays would be unconstitu-
tional.340  She is willing to tolerate overbreadth to gain certainty, and to allow for the
possibility that under her proposal, courts would “hold[ ] unconstitutional an enor-
mous quantity of symbolic speech that is not, in fact, endorsing religion.”341
clauses which requires that governmental acts provide neither an incentive nor a disincentive
for any religious belief or non-belief and related actions. Id.; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY
(2008).
Currently, the Court’s conservative members advocate formal neutrality on government
aid, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), but argue for government preference of
majority religion in expressive contexts, e.g., Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (joined by Scalia, J. and Thomas, J.).
335 See, e.g., Corbin, Ceremonial Deism, supra note 137, at 30 (using insights from Title VII
sexual harassment theory to emphasize the need for an outsider perspective). Difficulties in
implementation could be dealt with by adopting reliable assessment tools. See Shari Seidman
Diamond & Andrew Koppleman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 716 (2001)
(proposing systematic assessment of community members’ reactions to determine any message
of religious endorsement).
336 Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context, supra note 321, at 493.
337 Id. at 518–19.
338 Id. at 521.
339 Id. at 539.
340 Id. at 542.
341 Id. at 543. To illustrate, she would allow the classic scenario of a museum with a reli-
gious painting, but would prohibit the menorah which was featured along with the Christmas
tree in Allegheny. Id.
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It is this predicted impact, however, that renders her solution illusory, at least
in the Roberts Court.  Even leaving aside the nonpreferentialists, Justice Breyer also
likely would reject any doctrinal change which insists on removal of most religious
monuments and displays.342  There is a strong case for respecting the powerful emo-
tional ties that “values” voters have for these religious displays, and for building con-
sensus when fashioning constitutional rules.343  Removing most religious monuments
would profoundly alienate a large demographic and dissipate the Court’s social capital
for cultural conflicts with more substantial impact on peoples’ lives.
3. Professor Griffin’s Tolerance Theory & Adding All Religious/Philosophical
Displays
In contrast, the second alternative considered here relies on additive counter-speech. 
Writing post-Summum, Professor Leslie Griffin advocates prohibiting religious displays
in the public square unless a government will allow display of the symbols of any and
all religions and philosophies, including the less common, such as the Seven Aphorisms
and the Wiccan pentacle.344  Refusing new religious monuments while continuing to
display existing ones because the older ones show “our” history is not tolerant, she
argues, because it privileges traditional Protestant Christianity.345  This is one illus-
tration of Professor Griffin’s comprehensive theory of the religion clauses; her pro-
posal is rooted in a religious tolerance that extends beyond the Framers’ vision, of
diversity among Christian sects, to encompass other religions and philosophies.346 
Griffin rejects as intolerant not only the conservative historical approach, but also the
endorsement test and Justice Breyer’s legal judgment test, because they have allowed
religious displays where “secularized” by surrounding non-religious symbols.347
While I fully support Professor Griffin’s expanded religious tolerance coverage and
non-originalist constitutional interpretation, this particular proposal is too impractical
to solve the Establishment Clause conundrum posed by Summum.  Not surprisingly,
the positive example Griffin provided involved temporary holiday displays, rather than
permanent monuments.  The City of Mission Viejo, California first added a Muslim
342 Id. at 501–02.
343 See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 184, at 157; FELDMAN, supra note 23, passim.
344 Griffin, supra note 27, at 43, 64.
345 Id. at 64.
346 Id. at 42. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 334.
347 Griffin, supra note 27, at 66–69. But see Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as
Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O’Connor,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 187 (1987) (cited in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Professor Beschle saw Justice O’Connor’s
newly-formulated endorsement test as embodying tolerance, a core principle of liberal neu-
trality and the proper goal of the religion clauses. Writing before much application of the test,
he saw it as prohibiting clearly religious symbolism, such as the Ten Commandments, while
allowing holiday displays like the one approved in Lynch. Id.
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crescent alongside a crèche and menorah and, upon receiving applications from fifteen
different religions, the City accepted all of them and moved its holiday display to a
larger city park.348  While symbolic counter-speech is an effective and valuable method
of altering the message conveyed by prior divisive and exclusionary public symbols,349
there are physical space constraints for permanent monuments, and there is no agreed-
upon constitutional limiting principle for selecting among religious monuments.
As discussed extensively throughout the Summum litigation, a government that is
required to display all private monuments—or all monuments that reflect any citizen’s
religion or philosophy—will be forced to display none at all and to remove existing
donated monuments.  The problem is easy to demonstrate.  To start, Griffin asserts that
Pleasant Grove City’s rejection of Summum’s monument violates even Justice Scalia’s
narrow version of nonsectarianism because the Summum religion is a form of Gnostic
Christianity.350  As it turns out, there has been a complete overhaul of the Summum
website since the Court’s decision.  While formerly it emphasized the founder’s mum-
mification of pets in his backyard pyramid, and his receiving the religion through a
series of visits from extraterrestrials,351 the website’s homepage now displays images
of medieval Christian saints and highlights the worldwide use and historical pedigree
of the mummification process.352  This observation is not intended to disparage the
Summum religion, or to convey agreement with any version of nonpreferentialism. 
Rather, it suggests how difficult and inappropriate it would be for courts to order that
a particular religion must be permanently memorialized in a city’s public park.
Additionally, Griffin’s approach re-opens the concern over forcing governments
to display divisive or offensive permanent monuments, which then makes public parks
less welcoming.  As explained to the Court in Summum, while the Tenth Circuit ruling
stood, the Reverend Fred Phelps proffered an anti-homosexual “religious” monument
to cities that displayed an Eagles-donated Ten Commandments monument.353  Also,
rather than requesting to add a “Happy Solstice” sign to a public holiday display, it has
become fairly common for atheist groups to display signs proclaiming, sometimes
in harsh terms, that there is no god.354  Indeed, Professor Griffin’s well-regarded law
348 Griffin, supra note 27, at 71.
349 See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 238.
350 Griffin, supra note 27, at 63–64.
351 See About Summum, http://www.summum.us/about/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2008); Classes
with Summum Bonum Amen Ra, The First Encounter, http://www.summum.us/insidethe
pyramid/?class=FirstEncounter (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
352 Summum, http://www.summum.us/summum.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
353 See Brief for the City of Casper, Wyoming et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 1–5, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2007) (No. 07-665) (quoting
monument as stating: “MATTHEW SHEPARD Entered Hell October 12, 1998, in Defiance
of God’s Warning ‘thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind; it is abomination.’
[sic] Leviticus 18:22”); Chuck Oxlex, Boise Faces Phelps Controversy, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 3,
2003, available at http://www.religionnewsblog .com/5332/boise-faces-phelps-controversy.
354 See, e.g., Mallory Simon, Missing Atheist Sign Found in Washington State, CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/12/05/atheists.christmas/index.html (Dec. 5, 2008) (last
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and religion textbook shows the wide range of potential claimants if all religions’
monuments must be displayed; among those judicially recognized are Satanists, who
might desire to memorialize some fairly shocking ceremonies.355  It is this potential
cacophony that led to a 9-0 decision in Summum, and which renders the appealing
“more speech” solution also illusory.
In sum, given today’s strident political rhetoric, and the voices on the Court claim-
ing baldly that the government can endorse this Nation’s monotheistic religions, the
endorsement test—which purports to consider religious outsiders—may be the most
tolerant, yet realistic, of the Court’s current approaches.
D. Disclaimers and a Moratorium: The Price of Government Speech
In Summum, the Court recognized government’s unequivocal right to select monu-
ments for display on public land based on the message conveyed, and whether it is
viewed by the decision-makers as consistent with that government’s broad themes and
values, or “identity” messages.356  Summum granted cities the right to accept or reject
any privately-donated monument, and held that accepted and displayed donations
then are exclusively “government speech.”357  Given this characterization of all public
monuments, government now has an enhanced affirmative obligation to address the
reasonable perception that a monument is promoting a religious message.358
The proposal set forth here seeks to balance respect for tradition, and concern
about the discriminatory impact of privileging historical symbols.  It does so, in part,
by differentiating between old and new monuments.  As discussed above, the changed
cultural climate supports different presumptions of government intent regarding deci-
sions to display religious symbols.  And it also takes into account that there tends to
be a stronger human reaction to the physical removal of a longstanding symbol on the
shared landscape, as compared to a written denial of a request to erect a new symbol. 
Political divisiveness concerns suggest great care in calling for court-ordered removal
of public religious symbols.
1. Disclaimers
When sued under the Establishment Clause based on public displays with reli-
gious themes, governments regularly have proffered secular justifications.  What I
visited Oct. 27, 2010) (story about, and photo of, a large sign posted by the Freedom From
Religion Foundation, alongside a Nativity scene in a holiday display at the State of Washington
Legislative Building, stating: “There are no gods. . . . Religion is but myth and superstition
that hardens hearts and enslaves minds.”).
355 LESLIE G. GRIFFIN, LAW & RELIGION, 24–25 (2007) (describing a number of unusual
religious and philosophical claims, including a Satanic ritual involving eating human flesh, and
citing Howard v. United States as protecting a prison inmate’s right to practice Satanic rituals).
356 Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125.
357 Id.
358 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772–73 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
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propose here, for monuments that were erected in a more homogenous time, is the
minimum response to Summum required by the Establishment Clause: governments
should be required to display large, clear disclaimers setting forth these secular justi-
fications to all viewers.
A similar type of explanatory disclaimer already has been modeled in cases in-
volving non-religious monuments.359  Not uncommonly, a government’s original view
of history, one espoused when erecting a monument in an earlier era, now offends
people who have become full members of the political community.  Modern adminis-
trations sometimes have addressed this problem by adding signs which provide his-
torical context and conciliatory outreach, instead of destroying the monument.360  This
practice is optional, however, because there is “no political Establishment Clause.”361
Applying the disclaimer proposal to the much-litigated, Eagles-donated Ten
Commandments provides an example.  Governments that claim to rely on its “secular
message” to avoid Establishment Clause liability should be required to explain in some
detail how the display is related to civil ideals, and to demonstrate that its display in
359 See Dolan 2008, supra note 7, at 35 & nn.160–65 (citations omitted) (describing Santa
Fe’s addition of a plaque mitigating use of the term “savage” in a central monument, and
New Orleans’s addition to the “Liberty Monument,” which originally commemorated a
Reconstruction Era white supremacist battle).
360 Id.
361 See Kathleen Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of
Government “Neutrality,” 28 CONN. L. REV. 243, 258 (1996) (“There is no political establish-
ment clause. . . . The Establishment Clause operates as a unique gag order on government
speech and symbolism. Government itself may espouse any viewpoint a democratic majority
wishes except a religious viewpoint.”).
An interesting twist on this phenomenon occurred during the Summum oral argument.
In response to Summum’s counsel’s proposal that, to take advantage of the government speech
defense, all governments should be required to officially adopt the message of each donated
monument on public land, Pleasant Grove’s counsel countered with the example of a Holocaust
memorial which incorporated on its face anti-Semitic Nazi propaganda. Summum Transcript,
supra note 13, at 65. The City argued that this would not mean the government had adopted
the Nazi messages inscribed on the monument, only the history of that era. Id.
Instead, the analogy demonstrates the opposite: the monument’s meaning would vary
depending on the specific cultural context; if there were any ambiguity, a well-meaning gov-
ernment would include an explanatory sign. Picture a six-foot-tall slab of granite, inscribed with
ten Nazi-era sayings disparaging Jews and calling for discrimination against them. If located
in a majority Jewish suburb with a plaque identifying B’nai B’rith as the donor, perhaps the
benign meaning would be clear. But if located in a Christian-majority town, with few or no
Jewish citizens, accompanied only by a small plaque stating, “donated by the Freemason
Lodge,” the social meaning would differ. Without further explanation, clearly condemning the
statements inscribed and placing them in historical context, reasonable viewers would question
the monument’s meaning, and likely would attribute its text to the government displaying it.
Similarly, as discussed here, a stone monument inscribed with “I AM the LORD thy God” and
setting forth all God’s commands, supplemented only by an Eagles donation plaque, is likely
to suggest government agreement with the religious content of the Ten Commandments, so
long as nothing on the monument suggests any alternative government message.
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a public park is consistent with governments’ constitutional commitments to religious
liberty and tolerance.362  In finding that Texas intended the secular, moral message to
predominate when it displayed the Ten Commandments, Justice Breyer’s controlling
concurrence relied heavily on the Eagles’ role as a secular organization working to
combat juvenile delinquency.363  And in rejecting the Summum’s Seven Aphorisms
monument, while defending its existing Ten Commandments display, Pleasant Grove
City relied on the Eagles’ role as a secular charitable group with long-standing ties to
the community.364  Accordingly, as a starting point, I propose that courts should require
a disclaimer—sized sufficiently to be noticed and read by viewers of the monument—
that is similar to the one illustrated here, and contains the following elements:
This Ten Commandments monument was donated in 1971 by
the local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a charitable
organization which plays an important role in the life of this
community.  The donation was made in connection with FOE’s
nation-wide campaign to combat juvenile delinquency by remind-
ing those who viewed these monuments of a foundational moral
code shared by many.
The City continues to maintain this display in this public park
for the purpose of expressing its citizens’ gratitude to the Eagles
for their decades of civic and charitable works, and to honor the
role that the Ten Commandments has played in inspiring many
to lead good lives.
The City recognizes that this diverse Nation is founded on
the principle of religious liberty for all and, by maintaining this
historic monument, the City does not intend to express or convey
any religious message or to take any position on matters of reli-
gious doctrine.  May this monument inspire all citizens and visi-
tors to our community to reflect on their own individual sources
of moral values.
An explanation along these lines would provide needed transparency and would allow
governments, and courts, to walk the fine line between offending religious believers
362 This proposal is different, of course, from the one proffered by Summum during the
Supreme Court appeal; Summum requested an order that every government entity go through
a formal legislative process to adopt the message of every single monument donated or initiated
by a private person or group. My proposal relates only to the small subset of religiously-themed
monuments, and requires a brief clarifying communication to the public.
Note, too, that disclaimers are not a workable solution in all contexts, including where
they are not easily readable and where the content is interactive or not fixed. See Dolan 2004,
supra note 7, at 126–27 (discussing some limitations on using disclaimers).
363 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
364 Summum Reply Brief, supra note 123, at 9–10.
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by tearing down long-cherished monuments, and offending religious minorities and
non-believers by promulgating a sectarian religious creed.365
The more commonly provided “historical” rationale for governmental religious
displays presents a more complex problem.  Whether such disclaimer signs resolve
or worsen Establishment Clause problems depends on both the overall physical and
social/political context, and the content of the government message about that history.
As noted in the earlier discussions of Allegheny and Pinette, the overall context
affects a sign’s usefulness for correcting the appearance of government endorsement
of a display’s religious meaning.  At one end of the spectrum is the ubiquitous
example of the Supreme Court frieze, where the religious text is unreadable, and the
“origins of law” message is diverse and readily apparent to viewers, so that no dis-
claimer is necessary.  At the other end is the Ten Commandments display in Van
Orden, with its unavoidable, large-scale religious text, and its singular placement, right
next to the sidewalk that citizens traverse on their way to conduct business at the State’s
Supreme Court and Legislature.  Now that Summum has clearly labeled donated monu-
ments as exclusively government speech, this stand-alone Ten Commandments is an
unfiltered religious creed, promulgated by the State of Texas.  Given the distance of
the other statues on the Capitol grounds, a sign proclaiming that it represents Texas’s
history and a source of its laws, while consistent with the plurality’s reasoning, would
add to the Establishment Clause violation.  Using the disclaimer proposed above
would be an adequate remedy; using the disclaimer, and moving it to a less prominent
space on the Capitol grounds is a more complete solution.
The middle ground regarding the overall context includes the increasingly common
“sources of law” displays, which typically feature the Declaration of Independence,
the Magna Carta, and similar Anglo-American documents.  In the absence of a gov-
ernment actor’s religious motive, the overall context is generally defensible, and the
Establishment Clause focus turns to the disclaimer’s content, and how the government
explains the role of religious commands in its history. Where a sign proclaims, as a
government’s purported “secular” purpose, that “The Ten Commandments provide the
foundation of our legal code,” that historical explanation not only is inaccurate, but
also unconstitutional.366
365 This example could be modified if specific historical contexts provide a different, plau-
sible secular rationale. In its brief, Pleasant Grove City asserted that the Ten Commandments’
role in the Exodus story corresponded with its own local history as a Mormon pioneer town.
Summum Reply Brief, supra note 123, at 1. If that was the City’s secular purpose for the
display, the disclaimer sign could provide that alternative explanation.
366 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 971 (2005) (final sign included, “The
Ten Commandments provide the moral background of the Declaration of Independence and
the foundation of our legal tradition;” the legislative resolution authorizing the second version
of the display stated, “The Ten Commandments are ‘the precedent legal code upon which the
civil and criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded’”). See supra note 184 for the academic
critique. See also ACLU v. Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 849 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2010) (interpret-
ing identical sign, the sixth circuit stated that although it may be historically untrue, that is irrele-
vant to determining whether county’s stated historical/educational purpose for displaying Ten
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Disclaimers, of course, cannot resolve all Establishment Clause issues involving
government’s religious displays.  In some cases, a government has intentionally pro-
moted a specific faith or religion generally, or the government has not provided any
plausible secular purpose; in such cases, a court should require removal of the chal-
lenged display.  Also, the disclaimer proposal put forth here does not promise to quiet
all controversy; one can imagine vociferous debate over the size, placement, and
wording of the required sign.  Nonetheless, it provides a preferable baseline for such
arguments: a clear acknowledgement that government cannot promulgate religion
based on majority preferences.
2. Additional Restrictions on New Monuments
As the country has become more diverse, with increasing numbers of citizens
belonging to minority religions or none at all,367 erecting a new religious monument
frequently will be viewed as a deliberate act to proclaim and preserve the majority reli-
gion’s political power, rather than as an unintentional slight.  Thus, after Summum,
a different standard should apply to any government plans to display a new monument
containing religious themes or symbols.  Similar to the rebuttable presumption pro-
posed by Professor Hill for all such displays,368 the burden of proof should be placed
on the government to show that the message conveyed by the proposed monument
is secular and does not endorse religion.
The simplest, most defensible example is where there is a very clear historical
reason, which is tied specifically to the community or geography, such as a monu-
ment memorializing a missionary explorer, civil rights leader, or community service
provider.369  Where a new monument is likely to appear religiously-themed to ob-
servers, an accompanying written explanation should explain its historical relevance,
and some cases will require a pointed disclaimer.  At the other end of the spectrum,
Commandments was a sham). In Grayson, the court rejected an Establishment Clause claim
where a private citizen, Reverend Chester Shartzer, proposed posting the Ten Commandments
in the county courthouse and suggested surrounding it with other documents to avoid upsetting
“the Civil Liberties;” the county voted to approve posting of “the Historical Documents and
the Ten Commandments,” and allowed him to post the display, along with an “Explanation
Document” that the county government had not seen. Id. at 841–42.
367 See The Pew Forum U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (Feb. 2008), available at
http://religions.pewforum.org/ (comprehensive report, including findings that barely 51% of
Americans now are affiliated with a Protestant church, 16.1% are unaffiliated with any church
(including atheists and agnostics), and 4.7% are affiliated with non-Christian religions (1.7%
Jewish, 3% a variety of other religions)).
368 See supra Part V.C.2.
369 E.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Buono v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009)
(No. 08-472) [hereinafter Buono Reply Brief] (stating the statue of missionary explorer Father
Marquette is a National Monument with a religious subject); see also IMLA Brief, supra
note 3, Appendix C (listing monuments).
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and not salvageable by disclaimer, would be a newly-installed towering Latin cross,
or a new monolith reciting specifically religious text, in a prominent location, and
sized to be read by passersby.
The next scenario to consider is where an existing religious monument continues
to be maintained on public lands—assuming, for purposes of this discussion, that its
impact will be modified by a new disclaimer explaining its secular purpose.  Given the
public presence of a majority religion’s symbol, the question arises whether govern-
ments should be at least permitted (if not required, as envisioned by Professor Griffin)
to install new monuments symbolizing minority religions.  The selectivity and limits
problems described above, however, still would arise.
Here, Professor Bruce Ledewitz’s recent work on what he terms “higher law”
offers a helpful perspective.370  While government may not endorse religion, it is free
to endorse traditions of objective moral value, to promote ideals of justice and toler-
ance, and to reject nihilism and discrimination.371  Professor Ledewitz’s proposed stan-
dard is “whether it is plausible to view the religious language, imagery, or symbols at
issue as endorsing the principle of higher law.”372  Similar to the disclaimer proposed
here, Ledewitz would “force government officials to state, for the record, that par-
ticular instances of religious symbolism” are being used “for a deep secular purpose,”
and “to affirm a more universal justification for [their] use.”373
Returning to the idea of a government trying to send a more inclusive message by
adding countervailing monuments with minority religious themes or symbols, doing
so could present real challenges.  New installations of the monuments of one or two
religions might re-open claims of sectarian religious discrimination; at the least, it offer
new opportunities for religious divisiveness.  And creating a park space where a gov-
ernment agreed to display any monument expressing a religious or philosophical
370 Ledewitz, supra note 280, at 93 (stating by “higher law” he means “that there is some-
thing binding on all human beings everywhere”). Increasing global interdependence, along
with religious and philosophical diversity worldwide, particularly the deep divide between
secular rational and religious fundamentalist worldviews, has led academics in many dis-
ciplines to work on the project of finding common references for communication between
the two perspectives. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (2008); Michael Perry, Human Rights as Morality, Human Rights
as Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS RECONSIDERED (Mark Goodale, ed., forthcoming, Oxford Univ.
Press), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1274728.
371 Ledewitz, supra note 280, at 95. For a different approach on this issue see Beschle, supra
note 347, at 177–90 (stating government may influence, or attempt to influence, its citizens’
beliefs and values, but only as relates to the temporal welfare).
372 Ledewitz, supra note 280, at 98.
373 Id. at 102. Consistent with the “social meaning” discussion above in Part V.B, Ledewitz
asserts that this statement of deep secular purpose “becomes self-authenticating: . . . by forcing
government officials to affirm a more universal justification for its use, the Court would be
creating the broad community of believers and nonbelievers to which the justification refers.”
Ledewitz, supra note 280, at 102.
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message, proposed by any group or organization, risks creating a public forum for
religious speech—the very opposite of Summum’s practical result.
Where a religiously-themed monument from an earlier era remains on public
land (now accompanied by a clear explanatory sign), one reasonable option for in-
cluding other faiths may be to create a single new monument with a more universal
theme.  A monument fashioned to express a widely-shared ideal—such as peace, toler-
ance, or religious liberty—could include the symbols and images of a diverse range
of faith traditions and moral philosophies.  Where the majority religion’s symbol was
preserved, doing this would show respect for minority religions and would provide
the necessary balance, while still avoiding cacophony.
This proposal should satisfy the religion clauses because any religious symbol
used would be displayed as one among many, and the message expressed would be
an explicit community ideal that is independent of, though likely consistent with, reli-
gious beliefs.  Depending on the statue’s degree of religiosity, it, too, may require a
sign explaining the governmental purpose and disclaiming governmental endorsement
of religion.  Such communications would clarify that government’s role is provider
of religious liberty, and not arbiter of religious truth claims.  While there are no easy
answers, these practical proposals provide a means for both sides in these ongoing
religious disputes to have some voice, some presence, in the public square.
3. Application to the Salazar v. Buono Story
Salazar v. Buono374 presents the converse of Summum: the government has tried
to cure an Establishment Clause violation by privatizing ownership of the public
land underlying the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) cross memorial.375  The end
of this Article is not the place to analyze the recent Buono decision or explore fully
Summum’s application to the ongoing saga, but briefly applying my proposal to a
simplified version of the story provides a useful illustration.
In 1934, the local VFW post erected a large Christian cross as a war memorial
on Sunrise Rock, located on federal land in what is now the Mojave Desert National
Preserve.376  After the National Park Service (NPS) denied a request to erect a Buddhist
stupa nearby because such installations violate federal law, Frank Buono sued, alleging
that the cross on federal land violated the Establishment Clause.377  In January 2002,
while Buono’s suit was pending, Congress designated the Cross as a National Memorial
commemorating United States participation in WWI.378  Several years earlier, NPS
374 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (5-4) (six opinions).
375 For an interesting exploration of the “interrelationship between private-law arrangements
and public-law obligations” posed by the two cases, see Tebbe, supra note 14.
376 Brief of Respondent at 9, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (No. 08-472)
[hereinafter Buono Respondent Brief].
377 Id. at 2–3.
378 Id.
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had concluded that the Cross, which had been replaced over the years and was used for
Easter services, did not satisfy criteria for the National Register of Historic Places.379
After the district court held the Cross display unconstitutional, and while an appeal
was pending, Congress passed a law ordering transfer of the underlying property to
the VFW.380  The transfer was in exchange for a parcel owned by the private citizens
who maintained the cross to help their deceased friend, one of the original WWI vet-
erans involved.381  The transfer statute contains a reversionary clause that requires the
VFW to continue using the land as a war memorial.  The government maintained, and
the Supreme Court assumed, that the VFW may remove the Cross and replace it
with another kind of war memorial without triggering a reversion.382
The Cross is visible primarily to those driving on nearby Cima Road.  At oral
argument, then-Solicitor General Kagan asserted that NPS plans to erect a sign
explaining that the Cross is a war memorial, “that it was put up by the VFW, that it is
maintained and owned by the VFW,” and that the land on which it sits is now owned
by the VFW.383  This larger sign is in addition to a replacement plaque on the Cross,
and would be posted on federal land facing the road.384  This proposal triggered Chief
Justice Roberts to complain that this would be requiring “special warning signs” dis-
criminating against only “religious property.”385
Applying my conclusions from Summum, Buono presents another situation where
the social meaning of a longstanding religious display has changed over time; a clear
disclaimer is required to satisfy Establishment Clause principles; and where the new
religious symbolism—the “National Memorial” designation—should be subject to
a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality.
Like the Eagles-donated Ten Commandments, the Cross at Sunrise Rock has
a historical origin that is far removed from its more controversial present-day sig-
nificance.  The VFW amicus brief tells the moving story of a group of World War I
veterans, who moved to the desert based on physicians’ orders, seeking solace and heal-
ing from the “shell shock” of that brutal war.386  The VFW brief explained, and the
379 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812–13.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 Buono Reply Brief, supra note 369, at 20. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Congress did not prevent the VFW from supplementing the
existing monument or replacing it with a war memorial of a different design.”); id. at 1826
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1837 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
383 Buono Transcript, supra note 32, at 23.
384 Id. at 24.
385 Id. at 21–22. (“Well, isn’t that an interference or it’s singling out someone, [a] private
property owner, who’s using his property in a particular way, a religious way? You are going
to be putting up signs only for people putting up religious symbols. . . . [I]t would be only
religious property that would have these special warning signs.”).
386 Brief for Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 15, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (No. 08-472).
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Supreme Court’s opinion emphasized, that in 1934, a lone Christian cross was com-
monly used, and easily recognized, as the symbol memorializing the many soldiers
who sacrificed their lives in that War.387  In that particular era, despite the significant
participation of soldiers of other faiths,388 it may well be that the primary social mean-
ing of the Sunrise Rock Cross was as a tribute to the many lives lost in that war.
At the time Frank Buono sued in federal court, however, the cultural significance
of a large cross, strikingly displayed on federal land and used annually for religious
services, had changed dramatically.  Equally as poignant as the VFW’s story is the
amicus brief filed by American Muslim veterans associations.389  It describes their per-
ception of the Christian cross as a sectarian religious symbol that cannot serve as a
memorial to non-Christian soldiers because to them, it communicates that only those
who believe in the divinity of Jesus will have eternal life.390
Applying Summum to the Cross’s placement is not as simple as equating land
ownership with speaker identity because in Summum, when the Court stated that
viewers attribute any message communicated by a monument to the landowner, it re-
lied on the land’s observable status as a public park, linked with the city’s identity.391 
In Buono, there are no plans to demarcate the small transferred parcel, so without any
additional signage, viewers are just as likely to attribute the monument to the federal
government.392  Moreover, the government’s reversionary interest means, minimally,
that it maintains some control over the messages conveyed by the Cross.  While a
Cross monument on VFW land would not be “government speech” under Summum,
neither is it unambiguously private speech that clearly puts an end to the appearance
of government endorsement of Christianity.  And so even in this situation the minimum
Establishment Clause requirement should be a disclaimer sign, visible to observers
driving by, on which the government would explain: the Cross’s purpose as a war
memorial, its VFW ownership, and its historical roots as the symbol for honoring
387 Id.
388 See Buono Respondent Brief, supra note 376, at 40 n.26 (estimating that approximately
250,000 Jewish soldiers served in the United States armed forces in WWI).
389 Brief for American Muslim Armed Forces & Veterans Affairs Counsel et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9–13, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (No. 08-472).
390 See id. at 12 (“According to the central Christian claim that is symbolized by the cross,
Muslim soldiers, and other non-Christians, outside the saving grace of the cross, will be
eternally damned. . . . The threat of the cross is inseparable from the use of the cross to honor
the Christian dead. The cross is an appropriate symbol for Christian dead because it promises
resurrection and eternal life. But that promise is only to some, and it is paired with a threat
of condemnation to all others.” (quoting John 3:18 (King James)).
391 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (discussed supra
Part II.D).
392 See Brief of Petitioner at 51–52, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (No. 08-472)
(citing Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 87 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding transfer of park parcel underlying religious monument as an Establishment Clause
cure where marked off by a fence and private ownership was explained by a disclaimer sign)).
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WWI fallen soldiers.  This proposal is consistent with, but more extensive than,
Justice Kennedy’s suggestion to the district court that, if deemed necessary to end the
appearance of government endorsement of religion, on remand the court should con-
sider requiring signs to indicate VFW ownership.393  A disclaimer sign should be not
only welcomed, but required by the Court, for it would balance respect for military
sacrifice, and consideration of soldiers who feel excluded by such a memorial.
Turning to Congress’s designation of the Cross as a National Memorial, that
action is a form of government identity speech.394  Like the Ecuador government’s
intentional acts to re-frame their national identity to integrate indigenous peoples,395
naming the Cross as a WWI National Memorial is a declaration of the United States’
national identity.
Under the approach presented in this Article, the government bears the burden of
proving that any new government speech involving a religious symbol or theme has
a primarily secular message.  Here, the federal government would be charged with
showing that the purpose, and common understanding, of this January 2002 designa-
tion was to honor those who died in service, and not to make a sectarian statement. 
Weighing against rebuttal, however, is that the designation appears extraneous to the
goal of preserving the Cross as a war memorial.  Congress previously had acted to pre-
vent the use of government funds to remove the monument, so there was no immediate
risk, and the land transfer is a more typical way to preserve a historical religious symbol
than is proclaiming it a government symbol.396  Determining the constitutionality of
this government identity speech, however, requires in-depth contextual analysis which
is beyond the scope of this Article.397
Whatever the final outcome for the cross war memorial, its symbolic impact is
heightened by the country’s ongoing wars and the military’s current sacrifices.  This
calls for special deference to war memorials, and also special concern for veterans
393 Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1820 (plurality opinion).
394 For another article that identifies the National Memorial designation as government
speech, and discusses whether government endorsement issues would persist post-land transfer,
see Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, TUL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616167 (comprehensive
analysis of government speech issue proposing an “effective control” theory).
395 See supra Part V.B.
396 For discussion purposes, this Article assumes away the procedural irregularities; trans-
ferring ownership of the real property on which a public religious monument is situated some-
times is the best resolution of an Establishment Clause issue. See Jordan C. Budd, Cross
Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV.
183, 229 (2004) (Professor Budd, following a decade as Legal Director of the ACLU-San
Diego, wrote: “If, however, the relocation of a religious symbol cannot be accomplished
without significantly diminishing its communicative effect, other neutral concerns are then
in play—most importantly, government’s interest in promoting religious tolerance through
the respectful treatment of the icons of private faith.”).
397 For additional analysis of Salazar v. Buono, see Dolan 2010, supra note 329.
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who feel excluded by the Cross memorial.  Thus, as in Allegheny, a sign indicating
ownership by the VFW is insufficient.  In the event that the cross is displayed and its
National Memorial status continues, then the government’s posted sign, as well as all
the government’s written and online descriptions regarding this war memorial, must
explain to all that the designation was based on WWI historical symbolism and should
expressly affirm that the government honors the sacrifices made by all of its soldiers,
of all religions and none.
CONCLUSION
When the government has some role in a display with religious meaning, it is
constitutionally obligated to explain its secular message to viewers in a clear, visible,
and wholly transparent manner.  The message must be plausible, and not one that
endorses a religious creed as governmental identity speech.  That transparency and
neutrality are particularly essential in core government speech, where the government
sets out to express its own message, but also remains critical in government endorse-
ment contexts, where its stance toward private speech raises Establishment Clause
concerns of favoritism.
Explanations of historical bases, and clear disclaimers stating the government’s
broad-based religious neutrality, will not be sufficient in many contexts, but they are
a reasonable, workable solution for monuments.  So non-burdensome, in fact, that
resistance to the idea suggests that behind the unwillingness to express government
neutrality on religion lies the belief that government should not be neutral.  Whether
framed in the strict originalist terms of nonsectarian Christianity—or expanded to en-
compass Judeo-Christianity, the Abrahamic religions, or even theism—the real danger
now for religious liberty in the United States is governmental nonpreferentialism. 
Beginning judicial analysis with some form of the endorsement test, and requiring
a transparent statement of secular reasons where religious symbols are used, may not
satisfy either side in these disputes, but is far better than the threatened alternative:
relinquishing even the appearance of neutrality.
